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"FACE"-ING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
BATTLE OVER THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO
CLINIC ENTRANCES SHIFTS FROM
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FACILITIES TO
THE FEDERAL COURTS*
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)' protects wo-
men, reproductive health providers, and clinic operators against "block-
ades and invasions of medical facilities, arson and other destruction of
property, assaults, death threats, attempted murder and murder."2 As
* The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the policies or views of the Catholic University Law Review, its editors and staff, the
Columbus School of Law, or the Catholic University of America.
1. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat.
694 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)). FACE provides civil and criminal penalties
against one who:
by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimi-
dates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any
person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person
or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services.
18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).
2. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-488, at 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 724, 724
[hereinafter HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT].
Acts of force are prohibited under FACE, thus making it a feaeral offense to physically
assault someone, with the intent to injure, intimidate, or interfere with that person because
she or he is obtaining or providing reproductive health services. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)
(1994); see also S. REP. No. 103-117, at 22 (1993) (noting that the murder of abortion
provider Dr. David Gunn would have been an act covered by FACE) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT].
In March 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot three times by anti-abortion advocate Michael
Griffin in front of the clinic where he performed abortions. See Larry Rohter, Doctor is
Slain During Protest Over Abortions, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al, BI. Since Dr.
Gunn's murder, four people who were involved in some way with providing abortion serv-
ices also have been killed. In July 1994, Dr. John Britton, a physician who performed
abortions, and his escort, James Barrett, were shot outside a clinic in Pensacola, Florida, by
Paul Hill, a former minister turned anti-abortion activist. See Ronald Smothers, Protestor
is Arrested in Pensacola's 2d Clinic Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at Al. Most re-
cently, in December 1994, John C. Salvi III went on a shooting rampage starting at two
Massachusetts clinics where he killed two receptionists, Shannon Lowery and Leanne
Nicholas, and wounded five people, and ending in a Norfolk, Virginia, clinic where he
"sprayed the building with bullets," but wounded no one. Christopher Daly, Suspect in
Clinic Shootings Denies U.S. Charges, WASH. PosT, Jan. 7, 1995, at A3.
There has been much debate over the use of violence within the anti-abortion move-
ment. See Tamar Lewin, A Cause Worth Killing For? Debate Splits Abortion Foes, N.Y.
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evidenced by the types of activity the statute prohibits, FACE is not
about the legality of abortion: it is about providing citizens with the op-
portunity to freely enter a reproductive health clinic without fear of bod-
ily harm or threats.' FACE is a legislative response to "the growing
violence accompanying the debate over the continued legality and availa-
bility of abortion and other reproductive health services. '
4
TIMES, July 30, 1994, at Al. Three months prior to the murders of Dr. Britton and James
Barrett by Paul Hill, about 100 anti-abortion leaders met to discuss the appropriate means
of engaging in the abortion debate. See id. Paul Hill was among those present, and
although he did not speak a lot at the conference, his public advocacy of justifiable homi-
cide-that killing doctors who perform abortions is mandated by the Bible-sparked seri-
ous debate. See id. The Rev. Flip Benham, Operation Rescue National's Director,
vehemently disagreed with Hill's position, stating that "I think what [Hill is] saying is her-
esy, it's sin, it's murder, it's wrong, and it solves nothing, [and it] only makes things worse."
Id. Six months later, Rev. Benham acknowledged that "[t]here is little that federal mar-
shalls or anyone else can do to halt this murder and violence ... [w]e will not have peace
outside the womb until peace is restored within the womb." Jill Smolowe, Fear in the
Land, TIME, Jan. 16, 1994, at 34. Some anti-abortion groups convey that while they will not
mourn the death of an abortion doctor, they do not condone the killing of one. See
Rohter, supra, at B1. A few pro-life leaders have attempted to eliminate situations where
violence may occur all together. For instance, after the shootings by John Salvi, Boston's
Cardinal Law requested a moratorium on all protests outside abortion clinics in Boston to
prevent "anything which might engender anger or some other form of violence," and desig-
nated five churches for prayer vigils against abortion. Smolowe, supra, at 34.
Under FACE, prohibited threats of force include threats to harm another because that
person is obtaining or providing reproductive health services. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1);
see also infra note 10 (describing in detail the types of threats abortion providers have
experienced).
Physical obstruction is unlawful when it is engaged in with the intent to injure, intimidate
or interfere with another who is either providing or obtaining reproductive health services
by making it unreasonably difficult or dangerous to enter or exit a reproductive health
clinic. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) & (d)(4); see also SENATE REPORT, supra, at 7-11
(describing clinic blockades between 1977 and April 1993). The definition of physical ob-
struction includes clinic blockades, where activists barricade the doors of a clinic by chain-
ing people or disabled cars to the entrances. See id. at 7-11, 23; see also infra note 8
(discussing the types of physical obstruction tactics employed by protestors).
Intentional damage or destruction of property at a reproductive health facility encom-
passes arson, bombings, chemical attacks, and other forms of vandalism. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(a)(3); see also SENATE REPORT, supra, at 5-7, 23; see also infra note 7 (providing
examples of damage and destruction of clinic property).
3. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 (finding that violent conduct was interfer-
ing with access to clinics, and consequently interfering with the "constitutional right of a
woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy"); Evelyn Figueroa & Mette Kurth, Recent
Development, Madsen and the FACE Act: Abortion Rights or Traffic Control?, 5 UCLA
WOMEN's L.J. 247, 274 (1994) (advocating that FACE is not about the right to an abortion,
but instead is about providing a federal remedy to women who seek access to reproductive
health, but are denied because of clinic blockades).
4. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 3 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 699 [here-
inafter HOUSE REPORT].
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The outbreak of violence directed at clinic health providers, their build-
ings, and even their patients developed into an effective tactic for some
groups protesting the legality of abortion.5 Between 1977 and April 1993,
reproductive health providers reported over 1,000 acts of violence and
more than 6,000 clinic blockades.6 Specifically, Congress was confronted
5. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-11 (describing the "nationwide campaign
of anti-abortion blockades, invasions, vandalism and outright violence" that compelled
Congress to pass the FACE legislation); see also infra notes 2, 5-10 (providing examples of
the types of violent and obstructive activities that prompted FACE).
In 1993, the Los ANGELES TIMES chronicled trips by four abortion providers to Wash-
ington D.C. to persuade Congress to pass FACE to protect doctors and clinics from anti-
abortion violence. See Doctors Urge End of Abortion Foes' Violence, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1993, at A14. One physician asserted that anti-abortion groups terrorized him by putting
nails underneath his car tires, smashing his car windows, placing his photo on a "Wanted"
poster that accused him of murdering children, and sending him pictures of his parents
taken in public places. See id.
6. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. Congress found in 1993 that such acts
included "at least 36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, two kidnappings,
327 clinic invasions, and one murder. In addition, over 6,000 clinic blockades and other
disruptions have been reported since 1977." Id.
1996]
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with acts of trespass and vandalism on clinic property,7 physical obstruc-
tion of clinic entrances,8 attempted murder,9 and threats of violence.' °
7. Arson and bombings became quite prevalent; at the time FACE was introduced
there were approximately 200 attempted or completed acts of arson or bombing, causing
millions of dollars in property damage, and halting all clinic services to patients. See SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5; see also infra note 28 (describing types of health services
other than abortions that clinics provide).
In addition, chemical attacks were on the rise. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
A common tactic involved trespassing onto clinic property and drilling or chopping holes
in the walls in order to spray butyric acid into the clinic. See id. at 6. In addition to pro-
ducing an unbearable stench, butyric acid induces nausea, vomiting, burning of the eyes
and skin, and difficulty breathing. See id.
8. Physical obstruction can occur by people using their bodies to effectuate a human
barricade, either by sitting, lying down, or standing in front of clinic entrances or exits and
refusing to let others pass. See Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d
218, 221 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing a human blockade outside of abortion clinic); Women's
Health Care Servs., P.A. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 262 (D. Kan. 1991),
rev'd, 24 F.3d 107, vacated, 25 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 1994) ("When employing the tactic of
physically blockading the clinics, Operation Rescue has succeeded in its avowed intent to
'shut them down."'); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (describing the mechanics of a
human blockade).
In addition to human blockades, anti-abortion protestors often will strategically place a
disabled vehicle in front of a clinic entrance, and handcuff or weld some willing advocates
into the car by means of an "interlocking steel apparatus." United States v. Wilson, 73
F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Skott v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W.
3242 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-1523); see United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373
(7th. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141). Fire
departments must deploy firefighters armed with hydraulic equipment and blow torches to
extricate protestors from the vehicles. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 677..
9. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; see also Daly, supra note 2 (illustrating
the recent shooting spree by John Salvi, which resulted in five counts of attempted mur-
der). One high-profile case involved Dr. George Tiller, a physician who was shot in both
arms as he left a clinic in Kansas. See Seth Faison, Abortion Doctor Wounded Outside
Kansas Clinic, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20,1993, at A12. Assaults on clinic directors and employ-
ees often resulted as a consequence of clinic invasions, whereby providers were injured as
anti-abortion demonstrators attempted to drag them out of the clinics. See SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 4-5.
10. Dr. Gunn's life was repeatedly threatened before his murder; he was featured on a
"Wanted" poster bearing his name, photo, home address, and work schedule. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. One doctor received written threats personally delivered to his
home, one of which stated, "Those babies didn't know when they were dying by your
butcher knife. So now you will die by my gun in your head very soon-and you won't
know when-like the babies don't. Get ready your [sic] dead." Id. at 10 (emphasis omit-
ted). Even spouses of abortion providers are threatened. See id. One member of an anti-
abortion group confronted a doctor's wife and shouted, "'Aren't you afraid I'm going to
kill you?"' Id. In addition, intimidating messages were left on the wife's voice mail at
work, insinuating that she was being followed. See iL
After focusing on John Salvi's rampage, which took place at three separate abortion
clinics and left two people dead and five others wounded, some Massachusetts pro-life
groups "admit[ted] a possibility they have long resisted: that 'peaceful' protests using such
incendiary epithets as murderer and baby killer may create a climate for acts of lethal
violence." Smolowe, supra note 2, at 34.
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Faced with these types of violent, restrictive, and intimidating activities,
Congress recognized the need for national legislation to protect and pro-
mote public health and safety." FACE was passed to counter such con-
duct directed against abortion providers, their patients, and facilities.' 2
FACE discourages these activities by making it a federal crime to engage
in certain violent, threatening, obstructive, or destructive conduct aimed
at those seeking to provide or gain access to reproductive health
services.' 3
Since the bill's introduction in Congress, FACE has undergone legal
challenges in federal courts across the country.' 4 The primary allegations
11. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 703; SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-11.
FACE's sponsors in both the House and Senate cited the Feminist Majority Foundation's
study of violence directed at abortion clinics and providers as a confirmation of the neces-
sity of federal legislation. See 139 CONO. REC. S15,658 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy); see also Ana Puga, Half of Abortion Clinics in Survey Report Hostile
Acts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 1993, at 6 (highlighting the use of the Feminist Majority
Foundation's study in both House and Senate discussion of FACE).
12. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 703-04; SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-
11.
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994).
14. See generally United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.) (finding that Con-
gress has the authority to enact FACE under the Commerce Clause, and that FACE does
not infringe upon First Amendment protections), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086
(U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.) (up-
holding FACE under the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding that Congress had the authority to enact FACE under the Commerce Clause), cert.
denied sub nom. Skott v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-
1523); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of
FACE under the Commerce Clause, First, Eighth, and Tenth Amendments, and the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)); Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d 656 (4th Cir.) (up-
holding FACE as not violative of the First Amendment under the reasoning of its decision
in American Life League), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995); American Life League, Inc.
v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.) (upholding FACE under the Commerce Clause, First
Amendment, and RFRA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp.
791 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (finding FACE unconstitutional because Congress lacks the authority
to enact under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, and also find-
ing that FACE's regulation of speech is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment);
United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding FACE on Commerce
Clause grounds); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding the
constitutionality of FACE on Commerce Clause and First Amendment principles); United
States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding FACE constitutional under the
Commerce Clause and the First Amendment); United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1034
(N.D. Fla. 1994) (upholding FACE under the Commerce Clause); Riely v. Reno, 860 F.
Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994) (upholding FACE under the First Amendment, the Commerce
Clause, and RFRA); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1994) (finding FACE not
violative of the First Amendment); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422
(S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding FACE constitutional under the First Amendment and the Com-
merce Clause, and concluding that FACE does not violate RFRA).
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are that FACE: exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority; 5 of-
fends the First Amendment because it is a viewpoint-based regulation of
free speech; proscribes some types of peaceful protest;16 and is overbroad
and vague.' 7 It has also been argued that FACE violates the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)' 8 and the Free Exercise Clause princi-
15. See infra notes 95-134 and accompanying text (examining Commerce Clause juris-
prudence and challenges to Congress's authority pursuant to the Clause to properly enact
FACE).
16. See infra notes 154-362 and accompanying text (outlining and explaining First
Amendment free speech issues, and the allegations that FACE violates First Amendment
guarantees).
17. See infra notes 135-53 and accompanying text (examining overbreadth and vague-
ness doctrines and their application to FACE).
18. 42 U.S.C: § 2000bb-1 (1994). The pertinent section of RFRA provides that:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except .... [g]overnment
may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that application of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.
Id. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b). The findings section of RFRA indicate that the Act was passed in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the Court "virtually eliminated the re-
quirement that government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). RFRA was Congress's way of restoring the com-
pelling interest test that had been established in two landmark free exercise cases, Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b); American Life League, 47 F.3d at 655 (providing some cursory background
information on RFRA before delving into its application to FACE).
RFRA claims have been addressed in a number of FACE cases. See Cheffer v. Reno, 55
F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that FACE aims to silence the
religious tenet that abortion is murder and therefore is violative of RFRA); American Life
League, 47 F.3d at 654-56 (finding that FACE meets RFRA's compelling interest balancing
test); United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 866 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (concluding that even
if FACE substantially burdened religion, which the court did not address because it was not
explicitly argued, FACE meets the compelling governmental interest test), affd sub nom.
United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086
(U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 709 (D. Ariz. 1994)
(noting that plaintiffs failed to allege that "their religion advocates the use of... physical
obstruction to make passage to a facility unreasonably difficult or hazardous" as required
by RFRA); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1430 (S.D. Cal. 1994)
(finding that although it was not contended that FACE substantially burdened the exercise
of protestors' religion, Congress still had a compelling governmental interest that was met
by a narrowly tailored statute).
To prevail under RFRA, a plaintiff first must demonstrate that the government substan-
tially burdened his or her exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. If such a burden
is established, the restriction will be upheld only if the government can demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest that cannot be met through less restrictive means. See
id. If a law is neutral and does not create a substantial hardship on the exercise of one's
religion, then RFRA is not applicable. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 654 (explain-
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pies behind that statute.19 All but two courts have upheld the constitu-
ing that the threshold inquiry under RFRA is whether a religious practice was substantially
burdened by a regulation).
As an initial matter, FACE does not substantially burden religion because the exercise of
religion does not require acts or threats of force, physical obstruction, or destruction of
property. See Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1522 (observing that protestors did not assert that "the
exercises of their religion requires them to use physical force or threats of physical force to
prevent abortions"); Council for Life Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at 1430 (finding that the
plaintiffs did not seriously contend that the conduct prohibited by FACE was part of their
religion). But see American Life League, 47 F.3d at 655 (accepting pro-life group's asser-
tion that their religion required them to physically obstruct clinic entrances through peace-
ful picketing).
Assuming, arguendo, that the threshold showing mandating that FACE substantially
burdens religion is made, FACE meets RFRA's compelling interest test. See id Congress
has compelling interests in prohibiting the use of force and clinic blockades to intimidate
women from exercising the constitutional right to obtain an abortion, in protecting the
safety of reproductive health providers who work at the clinics, in safeguarding the health
of patients who seek services at clinics, and in prohibiting destruction of property and
vandalism. See Council for Life Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at 1430. The court in Council for
Life Coalition cited several reasons why the compelling governmental interest test is met:
(1) FACE prohibits violent and obstructive behavior that is unlawful under other state and
federal criminal laws; (2) this behavior has a deleterious effect on a woman's ability to
exercise her fundamental right to choose to have an abortion; (3) this behavior has resulted
in medical risks for women seeking clinic services; and (4) the proscribed conduct affects
interstate commerce. See id.
Finally, Congress narrowly tailored FACE to address "a narrow and carefully proscribed
set of actions that contribute directly to the compelling problems for which it sought to
provide a remedy," therefore only unprotected conduct and threatening activity against
persons providing or seeking reproductive health services is prohibited. Id.; see American
Life League, 47 F.3d at 656.
It should be noted that the Court has granted certiorari to determine RFRA's constitu-
tionality. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 83 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding RFRA as a
valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, and not violative
of the separation of powers, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and the
Tenth Amendment), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074).
See generally Jonathan Keiffer, Comment, A Line in the Sand: Difficulties in Discerning the
Limits of Congressional Power as Illustrated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 44
U. KAN. L. REV. 601, 610 (1995) (mentioning prominent arguments against RFRA's con-
stitutionality, such as issues of federalism and separation of powers, but focusing on and
concluding that RFRA was improperly enacted because Congress lacked purported au-
thority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." ).
A few claimants have argued that FACE violates their rights under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment because FACE restricts the ability of pro-life citizens to
protest abortion based on their religious beliefs. See Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1522 (concurring
with the Fourth Circuit that FACE does not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it is a
generally applicable statute and neutral towards religion); American Life League, 47 F.3d
at 656 (finding that the Free Exercise Clause does not "shield conduct violating a criminal
law that protects people and property from physical harm"); Council for Life Coalition,
856 F. Supp. at 1430 (finding that FACE is neutral toward religion and does not violate the
Free Exercise Clause).
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tionality of FACE.2" Of the two district courts that have held that FACE
is unconstitutional, one was overturned on appeal.2' The Supreme Court
A law that is neutral toward religion and is of general applicability, regardless of the
secondary effects it may cause, does not offend the Free Exercise Clause. See Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). Such a neutral
law does "not [need to] be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law
has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Id. If the law fails
the neutrality or general application test, the statute must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and also be narrowly tailored to further that interest. See id. (noting
that both the neutrality and general applicability elements are entwined, and that if one
element fails a cursory examination, it is likely the other will not stand).
Neither the legislative history, nor the text of the statute, suggests that FACE discrimi-
nates against a particular religion or against religion in general. See Council for Life Coali-
tion, 856 F. Supp. at 1430. Rather, the conduct is prohibited because of the harm it inflicts,
regardless of the violator's religious background or beliefs. See American Life League, 47
F.3d at 654. Consequently, under the Free Exercise Clause analysis, FACE does not enter
into the compelling interest examination. See id.
20. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373, 1375 (7th Cir.) (finding that
Congress has the authority to enact FACE under the Commerce Clause, and that FACE
does not infringe on First Amendment protections), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W
3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919, 922
(8th Cir.) (upholding FACE under the Commerce Clause, and finding that FACE does not
violate the First Amendment), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615);
United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 688 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that Congress had the
authority to enact FACE under the Commerce Clause), cert. denied sub nom. Skott v.
United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-1523); Cheffer v. Reno, 55
F.3d 1517, 1519-24 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of FACE under the
Commerce Clause, First, Eighth and Tenth Amendments, and RFRA); Woodall v. Reno,
47 F.3d 656, 657-58 (4th Cir.) (upholding FACE as not violative of the First Amendment
under its reasoning in American Life League), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995); Ameri-
can Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,647,652,656 (4th Cir.) (upholding FACE under
the Commerce Clause, First Amendment, and RFRA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995);
United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding FACE on Com-
merce Clause grounds); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1423-24 (D. Kan. 1995)
(upholding the constitutionality of FACE on Commerce Clause and First Amendment
principles); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1432-37 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding
FACE constitutional under the Commerce Clause and First and Fourteenth Amendments);
United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1034, 1036-38 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (upholding FACE under
the Commerce Clause); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693,700-10 (D. Ariz. 1994) (upholding
FACE under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, the Commerce Clause, and
RFRA); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010-11 (W.D. La. 1994) (finding FACE not
violative of the First Amendment); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422,
1426-31 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding FACE constitutional under the First Amendment, the
Commerce Clause, and concluding that FACE does not violate RFRA).
21. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 816-22 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (finding FACE
unconstitutional); infra notes 118, 125 (discussing the court's rationale in finding that Con-
gress exceeded the scope of both its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment au-
thority when it held that FACE was unconstitutional); infra note 143 (examining the
Hoffman court's decision in finding FACE unconstitutional because of its overbreadth).
Another decision striking down FACE as unconstitutional ultimately was reversed. See
United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied sub nom. Skott v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-
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rejected, without comment, three petitions for certiorari;22 two petitions
are still pending.2 3
This Comment analyzes FACE and the constitutional issues that arise
under FACE by examining the federal courts' treatment of the statute.
This Comment first demonstrates the inadequacy of protection available
to abortion clinic patients, providers, and operators prior to FACE. Sec-
ond, this Comment summarizes the major provisions of FACE. This
Comment then explores the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment
principles of vagueness and overbreadth jurisprudence, and delineates
the federal courts' analyses and reasoning in upholding FACE's constitu-
tionality. Finally, this Comment sets forth the proper First Amendment
analysis with respect to the regulation of both speech and speech-related
conduct. This Comment contends that courts are not engaging in a pre-
cise First Amendment methodology when reviewing FACE. This Com-
ment concludes with a thorough First Amendment examination of both
FACE's speech and speech-related conduct provisions.
I. THE NEED FOR NATIONAL LEGISLATION TO PROTECT ABORTION
CLINIC PATIENTS, PROVIDERS, AND OPERATORS FROM THE
VIOLENCE AND PHYSICAL OBSTRUCTION
ENGAGED IN BY ABORTION OPPONENTS
Since the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade24 in 1973, the controversy
over the legality of abortion has elicited a sincere, but increasingly vola-
tile, response from advocates who disagree with the holding of Roe and
believe that political and judicial responses inadequately address the
viewpoint that abortion is murder.2 5 The frustration of certain anti-abor-
1523); infra notes 118, 125 (discussing the Wilson district court's Commerce Clause appli-
cation of FACE).
22. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 683 (holding that Congress had proper Commerce Clause
authority to enact FACE); Woodall, 47 F.3d at 657-58 (upholding the district court's ruling
that FACE is constitutional based on First Amendment free speech issues, but vacating and
remanding without consideration the issue of prior restraint because the controversy was
not ripe for review); American Life League, 47 F.3d at 645 (finding that FACE does not
violate the First Amendment, Commerce Clause, or RFRA).
23. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1370 (finding that Congress has the authority to enact
FACE under the Commerce Clause, and that FACE does not infringe on First Amendment
protections), Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 913 (upholding FACE under the Commerce Clause,
and finding that FACE does not violate the First Amendment).
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to choose to have an abortion is part of
the right to privacy and is therefore a fundamental right).
25. Pro-choice groups have precedent on their side, consequently, they are more con-
cerned with maintaining the status quo. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH
OF ABsoLutrEs 7 (1992). Professor Tribe observed that because the "legal status of abor-
tion [was] snatched from the political dueling ground by the Court's 1973 Roe decision, the
public stage was left largely to those who believed most strongly that abortion was wrong
1996]
174 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 46:165
tion activists resulted in over 100 clinic bombings or arsons, over 300
clinic invasions, and over 400 incidents of vandalism by the time the bill
was introduced in March of 1993.26 Participants in clinic blockades "tres-
pass onto clinic property and physically barricade entrances and exits by
sitting or lying down or by standing and interlocking their arms."'2 7 Clinic
staff and patients are forced to break through this human barricade to
enter or exit clinics, or wait until law enforcement effectively can control
the situation.28 The killing of Dr. David Gunn, an abortion provider, by
anti-abortion activist Michael Griffin provided a poignant example to
absolutely." Id. Pro-life groups, however, face an uphill battle of persuading the Court
and Congress to effectively make abortion illegal. See id. Randall Terry, Operation Res-
cue's founder, has urged its members to disregard court orders and flood the jails and court
dockets in an effort to persuade the judiciary to stop enforcing pro-choice law. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. The field director of Operation Rescue National stated "[wie
may not get laws changed or be able to change people's minds, * * * [b]ut if there is no one
willing to conduct abortions, there are no abortions." Id. (omission in original). Such
behavior appeared to be working. See John Balzar, Abortion Foes Test the Limits, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al, A20 (marking a decline in abortion training at medical
schools because of the threats and escalation of violence).
One anti-abortion activist became so involved with the struggle to protest abortion that
he became a self-proclaimed fanatic. See id. at Al. Serving a seven year sentence for a
clinic bombing, he wrote in his newsletter: "I had to make sure before I approached the
abortuaries at night with gasoline and explosives that I was walking in love, not just an-
ger.... I'm a very narrow-minded, intolerant, reactionary, Bible-thumping fundamentalist
... a zealot and a fanatic!" Id.
It must be recognized, however, that the millions of Americans who are pro-life do not
condone the violence and scare tactics of certain extremists in the anti-abortion movement.
See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1376 (recognizing that the vast majority of those who oppose abor-
tion would not be affected by FACE because they engage in peaceful protest activity).
26. See 139 CONG. REc. S3523-25 (daily ed. March 23, 1993) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy introducing the bill); supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text (describing the conduct
that prompted Congress to introduce legislation to protect the rights of abortion providers
and patients).
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. According to Operation Rescue literature, a
"rescue" is defined as "'physically blockading abortion mills with [human] bodies, to inter-
vene between abortionists and the innocent victims."' National Org. for Women v. Opera-
tion Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989) (alteration in original) (quoting
Operation Rescue, National Day of Rescue-October 29, 1988 (1988)), affid, 914 F.2d 582
(4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub. nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (plurality opinion). A clinic "invasion" consists of nu-
merous anti-abortion activists "storming and entering clinics that are in the process of of-
fering services to patients." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 704.
28. See Women's Health Care Servs., P.A. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp.
258, 262 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 24 F.3d 107, vacated, 25 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 1994). The
court recognized that protestors successfully "frustrate or delay effective police action."
Id. When arrested, protestors refused to provide their names and "move[d] in a slow mo-
tion, heel-to-toe fashion, thereby greatly delaying the speed with which officers [could]
clear the entryways." Id. The Wichita, Kansas, clinic was closed for a week until federal
marshals arrived to assist local police. See The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1993: Hearing before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources United States Sen-
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Congress, illustrating that the violence and threats had escalated to the
point that additional legal remedies were urgently needed.29
A. State Law is too Local in Jurisdiction and Enforcement Powers
Abortion providers and clinic operators first looked to state law for
assistance in dealing with clinic blockades, bombings, and other disrup-
tions.3" The nationwide organizational efforts of anti-abortion groups
such as Operation Rescue,31 however, often overwhelmed local law en-
forcement officials who were ill-equipped to deal with the demonstrators'
tactics.32 Moreover, lack of consistency in existing state and local crimi-
ate on S. 636, 103d Cong. 14 (1993) (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno) [hereinaf-
ter "Hearing"].
It is important to realize that reproductive health services other than abortion are af-
fected by blockades. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 706; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 14. For instance, the executive director of a clinic that was destroyed in an arson
fire testified that the clinic had provided services such as "prenatal care and delivery, child-
hood immunizations, diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted infection, and contra-
ceptive services." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
When a clinic is subjected to a blockade, invasion, or property destruction that tempo-
rarily or permanently closes down the facility, the impact is felt by every patient regardless
of the services required. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 701 (providing an example
of a pregnant woman seeking pre-natal care who was denied access to a clinic because of a
blockade and could not keep her appointment). The Senate Report noted that the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918, 923 (Wash. 1986), found that a
blockade had "interfered with ill patients, placing a pregnant woman possibly suffering
from toxemia in acute medical danger, and delaying a patient who was miscarrying a
wanted pregnancy and bleeding badly." See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. Abor-
tion patients also run the risk of serious complications when going through a multi-day
abortion procedure which involves the use of laminaria sticks. See id. The sticks dilate the
cervix, and must be timely removed to avoid "infection, bleeding and other potentially
serious complications." Id. at 16. Because clinics often offer a range of services, and are
not limited to only performing abortions, FACE encompasses both pregnancy-related and
abortion-related services through its definition of reproductive health services as "medical,
surgical, counseling, or referral services relating to the human reproductive system." 18
U.S.C. § 248 (e)(5).
29. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text (discussing Dr. Gunn's murder and
other violence directed at abortion providers, and the need for national legislation).
30. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19-20. Congress, however, found that state
and local laws were inadequate because (1) the problem is national in scope; (2) even if
applicable local laws, such as those against trespass, vandalism, and assault, are utilized,
their penalties are so insignificant that they have very little deterrent effect; and (3) state
injunctive authority ends at state lines and therefore has no effect in other states. See id.
31. Operation Rescue is one of the largest and best-known pro-life groups in the coun-
try, whose organizational purpose is to prevent abortions and eventually to see Roe v.
Wade overturned so that abortion is illegal. See National Org. for Women, 914 F.2d at 584.
32. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-10 (describing local law enforcement offi-
cials' difficulties dealing with clinic blockades). For example, local law enforcement often
does not have the ability to handle a large number of protestors. See id. at 9. During the
"Summer of Mercy" in 1991, Operation Rescue repeatedly targeted abortion clinics in
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nal laws failed to provide predictability in prosecution or punishment.33
Such predictability is useful when attempting to deter violence and block-
ades surrounding clinics nationwide.34 Providers periodically found state
and local law enforcement ineffective because of its sympathies with the
pro-life message.35 For instance, local governments sometimes refrained
from prosecuting to the fullest extent, if at all, those who violated state
and local laws 36 by infringing upon the rights of abortion providers and
patients.37 The patchwork of state and local laws unraveled, becoming a
weak and at times non-existent response to the nationwide campaign of
clinic blockades engaged in by certain pro-life groups. 38
Wichita, Kansas, by obstructing access to the clinics and trespassing. See Women's Health
Care Servs., 773 F. Supp. at 265-66. Operation Rescue "virtually overwhelmed the re-
sources of the city's relatively small police forces to respond with dispatch and effective-
ness." Id.
33. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 707 (recognizing that state and local laws
"failed to provide the certainty of prosecution, conviction and punishment necessary to
deter these activities on a nationwide scale").
34. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 707. Jurisdictional problems were quite evi-
dent to state and local government officials who tried to enforce the law against conduct
organized and conducted across state lines. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. Cit-
ies simply had "'no practical ability to charge or seek injunctions against persons in other
states who may have planned the disturbance[s]; even if the states involved were willing to
extradite, the process would consume months."' Id. (quoting testimony of David R. Lasso,
City Manager, Falls Church, Virginia).
35. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that in some instances, local offi-
cials consciously disregarded anti-abortion violence and blockades based on personal
agreement with the protestors' objectives); Georgia M. Sullivan, Note, Protection of Con-
stitutional Guarantees Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): Operation Rescue's "Summer of
Mercy," 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 237, 258 (1992) (describing state and local government
support of Operation Rescue during the Wichita clinic blockades). The Governor of Kan-
sas spoke at an Operation Rescue rally and expressed her support of the pro-life move-
ment. See id. Moreover, the Mayor of Wichita, and the local United States Attorney
"praised Operation Rescue for its noble cause." Id.
36. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. In response to questions of selective
enforcement of state and local laws, a county sheriff in Texas replied "the law of the
Supreme Court, and in this case the United States of America and any other State in the
Union that makes it legal to murder babies, is wrong." Id. When asked whether he would
enforce the law, he replied that he would not. See id.
37. See Women's Health Care Servs., P.A. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp.
258, 266 (D. Kan. 1991) (observing that "significant questions exist as to the lack of zeal
displayed by the City of Wichita in defending the legal rights of the plaintiffs and their
patients"), rev'd 24 F.3d 107, vacated, 25 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 1994).
38. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 (stating that "throughout the country, pro-
life groups have organized blockades designed to bar access to reproductive facilities and
overwhelm local law enforcement"); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-9 (describing state
and local authorities' inability to effectively combat clinic blockades); supra notes 26-37
and accompanying text (explaining why state and local laws were ineffective remedies for
abortion providers and clinic operators).
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Frustrated by the deficiencies of state and local laws, abortion provid-
ers and operators looked to federal statutes for relief.39 Pro-choice
groups and reproductive health organizations successfully began filing ac-
tions for injunctive relief against interference with their activities under a
nineteenth century civil rights statute known as the Ku Klux Klan Act
(KKK Act).4°
B. The Inapplicability of the KKK Act
The KKK Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), is a civil rights law from
the Reconstruction Era enacted in response to the Ku Klux Klan's fierce
and savage race-based resistance to post Civil War reforms.41 The Act
prohibits conspiracies to deprive a person, or class of persons, of equal
protection under the law.42 Abortion providers and pro-choice organiza-
tions argued that § 1985(3) was applicable to modem day anti-abortion
violence and intimidation, in that there existed a recognizable class-based
39. See Hearing, supra note 28, at 14-15 (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno)
(explaining that although federal law was available, notably 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) as an in-
junctive remedy, the Supreme Court held that it was inapplicable to abortion providers and
patients).
40. Ch. 22 § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1994));
see Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991) (uphold-
ing an injunction issued under the KKK Act to restrain violent anti-abortion activity); Na-
tional Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993)
(plurality opinion); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1989).
41. See Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic:
The Supreme Court's Next Opportunity to Unsettle Civil Rights Law, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1357,
1363-64 (1992). The author examined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, and concluded that "[tlhe evidence revealed that the Klan used violence and terror
against blacks, supporters of blacks, and Republicans in an effort to undo the gains of the
Reconstruction era." Id. at 1364.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The provision used by abortion providers and clinic oper-
ators states:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protec-
tion of the laws .... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of
the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or prop-
erty, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recov-
ery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.
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discrimination aimed at women because only they can bear children. 3
Federal courts often responded by issuing injunctions under § 1985(3) to
prohibit violent and obstructive anti-abortion activity.4 Courts con-
cluded that violent opposition to abortion could constitute class-based
discrimination against women, and a denial of women's constitutional
right to interstate travel to obtain an abortion.45
In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,' however, the Supreme
Court severely limited the remedies available to abortion providers, hold-
ing that § 1985(3) did not apply to anti-abortion protestors. 7 Under
§ 1985(3), "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus [must be] behind the conspirators' action,, 48 and the
43. See Volunteer Med. Clinic, 948 F.2d at 225 (deciding the issue on first impression,
the court found sufficient evidence of "class-based animus" to support an action under
§ 1985(3)); National Org. for Women, 914 F.2d at 585 (affirming the district court's findings
that defendants' activities denied women seeking abortions of their constitutional right to
travel, and that women constitute a protected class under § 1985(3)); New York State Nat'l
Org. for Women, 886 F.2d at 1359 (finding that Operation Rescue's anti-abortion activities
fell under § 1985(3) "because defendants' conspiracy is focused entirely on women seeking
abortions," and "reveal[ed] an attitude or animus based on gender"). But see infra notes
46-53 and accompanying text (describing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506
U.S. 263 (1993) (plurality opinion), that overruled these decisions).
44. See supra note 43 (listing cases holding that abortion providers and clinic operators
had established a claim under § 1985(3)).
45. See Volunteer Med. Clinic, 948 F.2d at 224-25; National Org. for Women, 914 F.2d
at 585; New York State Nat'l Org. for Women, 886 F.2d at 1359-60. This argument, previ-
ously successful, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (plurality opinion).
46. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
47. See id. at 268. Although the applicability of the second clause of § 1985(3), other-
wise known as the hindrance clause, was not considered in Bray, the holding regarding the
first clause, known as the deprivation clause, rendered the KKK Act as a whole to be
limited and inadequate as a remedy against abortion clinic blockades. See SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 18; see also Hearing, supra note 28, at 14-15. The United States
Attorney General stated that the first clause can be used only in rare circumstances and
that although the second clause's applicability is questionable, at most "it will only provide
a cause of action where demonstrators have so overwhelmed local authorities as to prevent
them from providing the equal protection of the laws." Id at 15. But see Todd C. Cole-
man, Note, Hindering the Applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to Abortion Protests: Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 525, 548-49 (1994) (agreeing
with and elaborating on Justice Stevens' dissent that determined that the class-based ani-
mus requirement should only apply to the deprivation clause, and not the hindrance
clause).
48. Bray, 506 U.S. at 268 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
Prior to 1971, § 1985(3) only reached conspiracies that involved state action. In Griffin,
the Supreme Court recognized that § 1985(3) provides a remedy for private conspiracies in
addition to government sponsored action, as long as there is class-based animosity underly-
ing the private citizen's actions. See 403 U.S. at 96-97. The Court included the caveat that
behind the conspirator's actions there must lie "some racial, or perhaps other class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus" in order to prevent the statute from being used as a
general federal tort remedy. Id. at 102. This requirement is consistent with the sponsors'
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conspiracy must be actively directed at rights that are protected from pri-
vate and governmental interference.49 The Court held that the pro-
choice respondents did not establish either of these elements.5 °
The Court did not find discrimination based on gender, and pointedly
refused to equate the right of women to choose reproductive health serv-
ices with the types of racial discrimination § 1985 was designed to ad-
dress.5 The Court also declined to find that pro-life groups strived to
intent for the KKK Act, as the law was to be a restriction on those who prevent or deprive
others of equal rights under the law. See id. at 100.
49. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 268. The Fourteenth Amendment only refers to government
interference, not individual actions: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Certain rights, however, are protected from
private hindrances as well as governmental interference. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96-97.
Subsequent to Griffin, the Court had further clarified the use of § 1985(3) as a civil
remedy against private individuals in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local
610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). Carpenters made it evident that § 1985(3) applies
only to private conspiracies "aimed" at depriving a class of persons of a constitutional right
that is "protected against private, as well as official, encroachment." Id. at 833.
50. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 268.
51. See id. The Court declined to accept the following gender discrimination rationale
advanced by the abortion rights groups: because only women can become pregnant and
consequently have abortions, interference with that activity was class-based discrimination
predicated on gender bias. See id. at 271. The majority opined that the impetus behind
active opposition to abortion "does not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and for
such derogatory association with racism." Id. at 274.
In dissent, however, Justice Stevens emphasized that the congressional intent behind the
KKK Act was to protect citizens from "theft of their constitutional rights by organized and
violent mobs across the country." Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
One commentator contends, along the same lines as the plaintiffs in Bray, that clinic
blockades and shutdowns do demonstrate a discrimination against a woman's right to pri-
vacy, in which the right to abortion is found. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at 248-49. The
author asserts that no attempt is made by pro-life groups to infringe on a man's right to
privacy, because a man cannot become pregnant. See id. Therefore, only women's privacy
rights, and thereby women, are subjected to discriminatory tactics. See id. But see Carolyn
J. Lockwood, Comment, Regulating the Abortion Clinic Battleground: Will Free Speech be
the Ultimate Casualty?, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 995, 1029-39 (1995) (agreeing with the Bray
decision that women are not a protected class under § 1985(3), that there is no class-based
animus aimed toward women by the pro-life movement, and that there are no rights pres-
ent in the abortion clinic access situation that are protected against private conspiracies).
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deprive women of the constitutional right to interstate travel,52 a right
that in some circumstances is protected against private interference. 3
C. The Questionable and Ineffective use of RICO
Reproductive health providers and clinic operators have also used the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 4 as a
means of counteracting violent demonstrators and trespassers." RICO
has proven, however, to be too unpredictable and incompatible to relieve
reproductive health patients and providers from the types of conduct
anti-abortion activists subject them to.56
52. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274-77 (1993) (plu-
rality opinion). The right to interstate travel is not explicitly found in the Constitution;
however, the Court does treat it as a fundamental right. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (finding that, although not written in the Constitution, the right to
travel is fundamental, and has its roots in "the nature of our Federal Union and our consti-
tutional concept of personal liberty [which] unite to require that all citizens be free to
travel throughout the length and breadth of our land").
Justice Scalia, writing for the Bray plurality, asserted that the "'intent to deprive of a
right' requirement demands that the defendant do more than merely be aware of a depri-
vation of right that he causes ... he must act at least in part for the very purpose of
producing it." Bray, 506 U.S. at 276. The Court stated that because pro-life groups oppose
abortion in all circumstances, it is irrelevant to their activities that the abortion is per-
formed in the protestors' home state or after interstate travel. See id.
53. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 274. The Griffin Court found that the right to interstate
travel was one that in some circumstances would be protected against private, as well as
state, interference. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06. The Bray plurality clarified this con-
cept by declaring that the right to obtain an abortion, as an element of the broader right of
privacy, is not one which is afforded protection against private action. See Bray, 506 U.S.
at 278. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the right to free speech is not "protected
against private, as well as official, encroachment." Id. It would be anomalous, Justice
Scalia noted, to afford the right to abortion a preferred status over the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech. See id.
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994). Congress passed RICO in 1970 to target organized
crime activities. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
55. See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1357 (3d Cir.
1989) (upholding a jury verdict of a RICO violation based on intimidation, harassment,
and destruction of property). But see National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F.
Supp. 937, 941 (N.D. Il1. 1991) (refusing to find that pro-life defendants were part of a
national conspiracy to close abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity be-
cause no income was derived from the activity), affd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
510 U.S. 249 (1994) (finding that the plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action without a
showing of economic motive on behalf of the organization alleged to have violated RICO).
56. In Scheidler, the Court held that RICO does not require an economically moti-
vated enterprise, but left open the question of whether there would be a First Amendment
violation if RICO were applied to the anti-abortion movement. See 510 U.S. at 262 n.6; see
also infra note 65 (discussing First Amendment speech issues under RICO as applied to
abortion protestors).
After the decision in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, Congress still
discounted RICO as an effective remedy for abortion providers, patients, and clinic opera-
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Enacted as part of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it unlawful for a
person to be employed by or associated with an enterprise57 "engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."5" The term
"enterprise" implies a business or other type of profit-motivated ven-
ture.5 9 As pro-choice plaintiffs attempted to use § 1962(c) to obtain re-
lief, courts confronted the issue of whether the pro-life "enterprise" must
be shown to be economically motivated.61 Many courts found that contri-
butions and donations were inadequate under the statute to prove that
pro-life organizations were financially and commercially motivated,
thereby qualifying as an "enterprise" under RICO.6
tors. See 140 CONG. REC. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(noting that the Supreme Court decision demonstrated that RICO was no substitute for
national legislation specifically drafted to deal with the problems experienced by abortion
providers and patients).
57. The Act defines "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
58. Id § 1962(c). The Act defines racketeering activity to include "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in ob-
scene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical... which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." Id.
§ 1961(1)(A). A pattern of racketeering activity under RICO requires at least two predi-
cate acts of racketeering activity. See id § 1961(5).
59. See supra note 57 (containing the definition of "enterprise" under RICO).
60. Circuit courts disagreed on the issue of whether RICO required a profit motive.
See Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629 (reasoning that "non-economic crimes committed in further-
ance of non-economic motives are not within the ambit of RICO"); United States v. Ivic,
700 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1983) (interpreting RICO as requiring a profit motive); United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980) (requiring a profit motive). But see
McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350 (finding that lack of economic motivation by an enterprise is
not necessary to sustain an action under RICO).
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits interpreted RICO to mean that the enterprise
must have economic motivation, and consequently found that pro-life defendants and or-
ganizations were political and not profit-driven entities. See Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629
(holding that the emphasis on business in RICO supports the conclusion that only econom-
ically motivated enterprises are covered under RICO); Ivic, 700 F.2d at 62-63 (asserting
that because RICO was crafted to apply to illegitimate businesses and the infiltration of
legitimate establishments by organized crime, an economic motive requirement is implicit
in the statute); Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372 (holding that Congress only intended RICO to
cover enterprises that had an identifiable economic goal as a business purpose).
The Third Circuit did not construe RICO to require a profit-based enterprise. See
McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350. In a footnote, the court recognized that the defendants'
anti-abortion activities were not motivated by an economic purpose, yet stated that eco-
nomic motivation is not a required element of a valid claim under RICO. See id at 1349
n.7.
61. See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 944 (N.D. I11.
1991) (observing that the pro-life organization's purpose is political in nature, despite re-
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Resolving a split in the circuit courts on this issue, the Supreme Court
interpreted RICO as not requiring that an enterprise be economically
motivated in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler.62
Although the language of RICO suggests that an enterprise must possess
a profit-driven motivation, the Court found that the statutory language
expressly includes enterprise activities which "affect" interstate com-
merce, and thereby eliminated the direct profit motivation inference be-
hind the term "enterprise. 63
Because the Court simply restricted the opinion to find that economic
motivation is not required under RICO, this holding does not necessarily
translate into a finding that certain violent and obstructionist conduct by
abortion protestors are RICO violations.6' Indeed, First Amendment
concerns arise when abortion providers and clinic operators attempt to
use RICO's § 1962(c) to state a claim against individual members of pro-
life groups. 65  Further, the complex nature of RICO litigation, and the
ceiving donations from pro-life supporters), affd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510
U.S. 249 (1994).
Under § 1962(a), income must be "derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). In Scheidler, the district court dismissed the
§ 1962(a) claim because donations given to the defendant's group did not meet the require-
ment of direct or indirect derivation of income from racketeering. See 765 F. Supp. at 941.
62. 510 U.S. 249 (1994). In 1986, the National Organization for Women attempted to
use RICO as a remedy against clinic blockades. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941. By alleging
that members of an anti-abortion group were involved in trespassing, blocking ingress and
egress to clinics, and damaging clinic property, the plaintiffs tried to establish a national
conspiracy to close abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering. See id at 938-39.
The district court dismissed the claim. See id. at 941. The decision was affirmed on appeal
by the Seventh Circuit, holding that the plaintiffs did not establish that the defendants'
anti-abortion activities were profit-motivated as required by RICO. See Scheidler, 968
F.2d at 629-30.
63. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 258. The Court acknowledged that "predicate acts, such
as the alleged extortion, may not benefit the protestors financially but still may drain
money from the economy by harming businesses such as the clinics." Id. at 260.
64. See id. at 262. The Court's holding simply stood for the proposition that abortion
providers do not have to show that anti-abortion groups are economically motivated to
state a claim under RICO. See id.
65. RICO's usefulness to abortion clinic operators was further eroded by footnote 6 of
the Scheidler majority opinion. See id. at 262 n.6. The Court implied that a legitimate
argument could be made that the application of RICO to abortion protestors could affect
protected First Amendment speech. See id. Justice Souter's concurrence also pronounced
that the Court's holding would not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application
in cases brought by pro-life plaintiffs. See id. at 263 (Souter J., concurring).
On remand, certain paragraphs of plaintiffs' third amended complaint were stricken be-
cause of First Amendment considerations. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 897 F.
Supp. 1047, 1088 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The district court identified the issue as whether certain
words used by the defendants were "fighting words," that is "speech that calls for or tends
to produce or incite violence." Id. at 1084. Fighting words are excluded from First
Amendment protection. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see
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fact that Congress specifically drafted RICO to deal with activities associ-
ated with organized crime, create difficulties when clinic providers and
operators attempt to bring actions for destruction of clinic property, phys-
ical obstruction of clinic entrances, or assault.66
II. FACE: A SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS
In response to growing concern about the violent nature of clinic block-
ades, bombings, force, and threats of force faced by women and repro-
ductive health providers, both Houses of Congress introduced legislation
in 1993.67 Congress laid the foundation to enact the legislation through
also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (precluding speech that incites immi-
nent unlawful conduct from First Amendment protection). To fall under this exclusion, the
speech must be likely to immediately incite unlawful conduct. See id. at 447. When exam-
ining the complaint, the court reviewed the allegations with an eye to whether the defend-
ants' speech was "so closely linked in time and place to the violence that the law must
intervene and prohibit the provocation from occurring." Scheidler, 897 F. Supp. at 1086.
In several instances, the court did not find so, and consequently found protected First
Amendment speech contained in the plaintiffs' complaint allegations. See id. at 1088; see
also Carole Golinski, In Protest of NOW v. Scheidler, 46 ALA. L. REV. 163, 184 (1994)
(asserting that "in assessing individual liability of organization members, it is a sound con-
stitutional principle that civil liability cannot be imposed merely because an individual be-
longs to a group in which some members have committed acts of violence"); Steven E.
Soule & Karen R. Weinstein, Recent Development, Racketeering, Anti-Abortion Protes-
ters, and the First Amendment, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 365, 387 (1994) (discussing the First
Amendment issues that arise under RICO where (1) unlawful acts are only committed by a
few members of a pro-life organization who do not condone or sanction such behavior, and
(2) some of RICO's predicate acts are protected conduct under the First Amendment).
66. A defendant must have committed two predicate acts in order to be prosecuted
under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994). Predicate acts include such crimes as brib-
ery, gambling, extortion, and drug dealing. See id. § 1961(1)(A). These types of acts are
extremely uncommon in anti-abortion conduct situations and therefore would not easily
create RICO liability. See 140 CONG. REC. 5596 (1994) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Sen-
ator Kennedy explained that even though the Supreme Court's decision in Scheidler was
not completely unfavorable to clinic operators and staff, because the types of anti-abortion
conduct surrounding clinics do not constitute a RICO predicate act, the statute did not
provide an adequate substitute for FACE in addressing violent and obstructive anti-abor-
tion activity. See id. Even the attorney for the plaintiffs in the Scheidler case stated that
"most clinics won't be able to use RICO." Paul M. Barrett, New Legal Weapon in Abor-
tion Fight Is Hard to Use and Hard to Enforce, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1994, at B1 (quoting
Fay Clayton, lead attorney for NOW); see also Charles W. Hall & Robert O'Harrow Jr.,
Abortion Clinic Violence Probe Was Over at the Start, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1996, at B1
(reporting on a federal grand jury's investigation that found no direct evidence of a pro-life
national conspiracy involving abortion clinic violence under RICO). But see Susan A.
Ronn, Comment, "FACE"-ing RICO: A Remedy for Antiabortion Violence?, 18 SEATTLE
U. L. Rev. 357, 378-81 (1995) (acknowledging and addressing the First Amendment issues
present when applying RICO to protests surrounding abortion clinics, but contending that
RICO is an effective solution to counter the violence and obstruction surrounding clinics).
67. Representatives Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Constance Morella (R-MD) intro-
duced House Bill 796 on February 3,1993. H.R. 796, 103d Cong. (1993). Senator Edward
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its Commerce Clause authority by outlining the interstate nature of the
violent and coercive activity. 68 Furthermore, Congress attempted to allay
the fears of peaceful pro-life protestors who expressed concern that their
M. Kennedy (D-MA) introduced Senate Bill 636 on March 23, 1993. S. 636, 103d Cong.
(1993).
Advocates on each side of the abortion controversy testified: Dr. Pablo Rodriguez, Med-
ical Director of Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, recalled death threats and trespass-
ing incidents; Willa Craig, the Executive Director of Blue Mountain Clinic in Missoula,
Montana, recounted the escalating violence centered around the clinic, culminating in an
act of arson that destroyed it; Joan Appleton of Pro-Life Action Ministries stressed that
the bill would jeopardize sidewalk counseling and thus curtail informed consent; Nicholas
Nikas, American Family Association, advocated that the bill was unconstitutional on its
face and would severely chill First Amendment rights. Hearing, supra note 28, at 48-72,
108-10, 122-43.
The House and Senate voted on the final version of FACE in May of 1994. 140 CONG.
REc. H3134 (daily ed. May 5,1994); 140 CONG. REc. S5628 (daily ed. May 12, 1994). On
May 5, 1994, by a roll call vote of 222-193, the House agreed to the Conference Report.
140 CONG. REc. H3134 (daily ed. May 5, 1994). The Senate also consented to it on May
12, 1994, by a roll call vote of 69-30. 140 CONG. REc. S5628 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
President Clinton signed the bill into law at a televised media event at the White House on
May 26, 1994. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
259, 108 Stat. 695 is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
68. Four basic findings support Commerce Clause application. First, Congress found
that clinics operate within the stream of interstate commerce by purchasing and leasing
medical business necessities and employing clinic physicians and staff from other states,
and that the anti-abortion activities substantially affect clinic participation in interstate
commerce. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 705; see also Hearing, supra note 28, at 16
(statement of Attorney General Janet Reno). The Attorney General reaffirmed Con-
gress's position that the provision of abortion services affected interstate commerce. See
id. Because clinic operators "purchase or lease facilities, purchase and sell equipment,
goods, and services, employ people, and generate income," the Attorney General main-
tained that there was a direct connection to interstate commerce. Id.
Second, Congress found that patients often must travel to other states to obtain repro-
ductive health services because of the lack of such services in their location, and that clinic
staff sometimes travel interstate to provide reproductive health services. See HOUSE RE.
PORT, supra note 4, at 705; SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. Moreover, Congress
found that rural clinics and doctors have been specifically targeted because the elimination
of a single provider can virtually eradicate abortion services for women in that area. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 705.
Third, Congress found that the obstruction of clinics and the violence surrounding them
decreases the availability of abortion services on a national scale. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 12. Leaders of Operation Rescue testified that the organization's avowed
purpose is to stop abortions from being performed. See id. at 11. Doctors who provide
abortions are targeted as the "weak link" in the provision of abortion services; anti-abor-
tion activist Randall Terry has stated his avowed intention to make abortion doctors' lives
"a living hell." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 706. Another related method for achiev-
ing the goal of preventing abortions is to eliminate access to clinics by closing clinics down.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. The field director of Operation Rescue National
declared "[w]e may not get laws changed or be able to change people's minds ... [b]ut if
there is no one willing to conduct abortions, there are no abortions." Id.
Finally, Congress found that the obstruction of clinic entrances is a national problem and
thus cannot be effectively handled on a state level. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at
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First Amendment rights would be jeopardized by inserting a section into
FACE that provides that nothing in FACE limits First Amendment
guarantees. 6
9
FACE makes it a federal offense if any person:
by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intention-
ally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or
has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other per-
son or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing repro-
ductive health services.7 °
FACE also renders it unlawful to intentionally damage or destroy the
property of reproductive health facilities.7' Congress cautiously modeled
FACE's language after the language of several federal civil rights laws
that prohibit similar activity and have survived constitutional chal-
lenges.72 In addition, Congress defined the important terminology used
in FACE to stave off attacks for vagueness.73
707. Operation Rescue admittedly engaged in a national campaign to close abortion clin-
ics. See id.
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1); HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 725-26.
Congress provided that nothing in the statute shall be construed to "prohibit any expres-
sive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected
from legal prohibition by the First Amendment." 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1). Subsection (d) of
the Rules of Construction also provide that FACE was not designed to create new reme-
dies or limit existing ones for interference with protected First Amendment activities
outside clinic entrances, provide for exclusive criminal penalties or civil remedies, or pre-
empt state or local laws prohibiting such conduct. See id. § 248(d)(2)-(3). Congress fur-
ther emphasized that its intent was not to interfere with state and local laws that regulate
the performance of abortions. See id. § 248(d)(4).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1). FACE prohibits the same conduct when one is interfering
or attempting to interfere with a person's religious freedom, or is intentionally destroying
property at a place of worship. See id. § 248(a)(2)-(3). The Act also carves out a parental
and legal guardian exemption to the above prohibited conduct when such conduct is being
directed solely at the minor child. See id. § 248(a)(3).
71. See id § 248(a)(3); see also supra note 7 (describing types of property destruction
and vandalism at abortion clinics).
72. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 25. FACE's language is modeled after sev-
eral civil rights statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 245(b), which protects voting rights and jury
service, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, which prevents force or interference with a person's rights
under the Fair Housing Act. See id.
73. Key terms are provided to assist the public, and law enforcement, and the courts in
understanding what type of conduct is prohibited. Among the most important are the
terms: "interfere with," which means to restrict someone's freedom of movement, 18
U.S.C. § 248(e)(2) (1994); "intimidate," defined as placing someone in "reasonable appre-
hension of bodily harm," id. § 248(e)(3); and "physical obstruction," which includes mak-
ing passage into or out of a clinic either impassable or "unreasonably difficult or
hazardous," id. § 248(e)(4).
Although Congress did not define what type of speech constitutes a threat of force in
FACE, legislative history is instructive. See HOusE REPORT, supra note 4, at 708 (stressing
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The Act provides for both criminal penalties and civil remedies.74 A
first time criminal offender may be fined in accordance with the title, im-
prisoned up to one year, or both.75 A subsequent offender with a prior
FACE conviction may be fined in accordance with the title, imprisoned
up to three years, or both.76 More lenient guidelines apply to exclusively
non-violent physical obstruction convictions: a first-time offender may be
fined up to $10,000, imprisoned up to six months, or both.77 A repeat
non-violent physical obstruction offender may be fined up to $25,000, im-
prisoned up to eighteen months, or both.78 However, if bodily injury re-
sults, the offender may be imprisoned for up to ten years.79 If death
results, any term of imprisonment, even a life sentence, may be
imposed.80
A civil cause of action is available for a person harmed by conduct
prohibited by FACE while seeking or providing reproductive health serv-
that in order for a threat of force to violate FACE, it must be "real and meaningful");
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 (stating that a threat under FACE is where "it is
reasonably foreseeable that the threat would be interpreted as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm").
74. 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)-(c).
75. See id. § 248(b)(1).
76. See id. § 248(b)(2).
77. See id. § 248(b). See United States v. Unterberger, 97 F.3d 1413 (11th Cir. 1996).
Examining a non-violent physical obstruction conviction, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the Sixth Amendment did not guarantee a right to a jury trial when the maximum prison
term for the violation was no greater than six months. See id. at 1415. The court held that
the additional statutory penalty of a maximum fine of $10,000 was not severe enough to
elevate the crime to "serious" which would have entitled the defendants to a jury trial. See
id. at 1416. The Unterberger decision relied on a recent Supreme Court opinion, United
States v. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996), in reaching its conclusion. See Unterberger, 97 F.3d
at 1416. Lewis reaffirmed the principle that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial when the defendant is charged with a "petty" offense, indicated solely by violations
with a maximum authorized prison term of no more than six months. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct.
at 2166. The Lewis Court emphasized that the legislature's proposed prison term for the
offense is the only criterion to be used when determining whether a crime is serious or
petty. See id. Other penalties that accompany the prison term, such as the fine in Un-
terberger, were not to be considered unless penalties are "so severe as to indicate that the
legislature considered the offense serious." Id. at 2166-67. In United States v. Soderna, 82
F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-
141), the Seventh Circuit also held that the defendants charged with a non-violent physical
obstruction violation did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial under FACE. See
Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1378. The court reasoned that under Supreme Court precedent, be-
cause the offense only allowed up to six months in jail, it is a petty offense. See id. The
court was not persuaded that the additional statutory penalty of a maximum $10,000 fine
was sufficient to increase the "severity of punishment well beyond that of the prison term."
I.
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2). These fines are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund.
See HOUSE CONFERENcE REPORT, supra note 2, at 726.
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2) (1994).
80. See id.
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ices. 8 ' In addition, either the United States Attorney General or a state
attorney general may commence a civil action if there is reasonable be-
lief that someone may be injured through a violation of the statute. 82
The plaintiff may be granted temporary, preliminary, or permanent
injunctive relief,8 3 as well as compensatory and punitive dam-
81. See id. § 248(c)(1)(A).
82. See id. § 248(c)(2)-(3). In an action initiated by the government, the court may
assess civil penalties to "vindicate the public interest." Id. § 248(c)(2)(B).
83. See id. § 248(c)(1)(B). Quite often, both statutes and injunctions seek to regulate
conduct that takes place in a public forum; therefore, protected speech may be subjected to
time, place, and manner restrictions. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). A full discussion of the intricacies of First Amendment
application to time, place, and manner restrictions is beyond the range of this Comment;
however, a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's abortion "buffer-zone" injunction
decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), is useful because
FACE provides for federal injunctive relief. See Figueroa & Kurth, supra note 3, at 272
(declaring that both FACE and Madsen offer assistance to abortion clinic patients,
providers, and operators: FACE providing federal injunctive relief and Madsen permitting
state courts to issue protective injunctions).
The principle inquiry in examining a statute or injunction that affects the time, place, or
manner of speech is content-neutrality, which is determined by whether government has
regulated speech "'without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' Madsen,
114 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
Generally, a content-based regulation of speech in a public area will be upheld only if the
regulation meets the compelling governmental interest standard, that is, the regulation
must be narrowly tailored and necessary to meet a compelling governmental interest. See
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. If a statute or injunction is content-neutral, the
regulation's constitutionality is measured by the more modest substantial governmental
interest standard of whether it is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest," and "leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). It
has been recognized that the Court has also used the four pronged United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 397 (1968) analysis when reviewing time, place, and manner restrictions.
See id. at 298 (pointing out that O'Brien's four part test for evaluating the regulation of
speech-related conduct is very similar to the analysis of time, place, and manner
regulations); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.47, at
1087 (4th ed. 1991) (stating that the Court has articulated two slightly different methods of
treating time, place, and manner restrictions, one of which is laid out in O'Brien); see also
infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (describing the four-pronged O'Brien test).
Prior to Madsen, courts applied the substantial governmental interest standard to both
statutes and injunctions that were found to be content-neutral and generally applicable.
See Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 1993)
(employing the substantial governmental interest standard to an anti-abortion protest
injunction). But see Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 710 (11th Cir. 1993) (examining a
similar protest injunction, the court applied the compelling governmental interest standard
and struck down the injunction). The Supreme Court in Madsen, however, increased the
level of scrutiny required for a content-neutral injunction, which applies to a select
individual or group, as opposed to a content-neutral statute, which applies to the general
public. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524-25. The Madsen Court reasoned that because
injunctions, unlike statutes, may be applied in a discriminatory fashion, a more stringent
First Amendment analysis was required for content-neutral injunctions. See id. The
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ages.' The plaintiff has the option to choose, in lieu of actual compen-
satory damages, a statutory award of $5,000 per violation.85
current standard of review provided by Madsen is "whether the challenged provisions of
the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest." Id. at 2525; see Jennifer Wohlstadter, Note, Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc.: The Constitutionality of Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
543, 573 (1995) (maintaining that although the new standard introduced by the Court in
Madsen places more of a burden on abortion clinic providers and operators, the protestors'
First Amendment rights are now better protected through the slightly higher standard of
scrutiny).
When the regulation affects constitutionally protected activity, the injunction must be
characterized by "'precision of regulation."' Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). Each provision of the injunction must be scrutinized
to determine if it is narrowly tailored and does not unduly burden more speech than
necessary. See id. at 2526-30. The Madsen Court upheld limited noise restrictions and a
36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveways, but struck down other
provisions, such as the state court's prohibition of the display of signs, as overly restrictive
and burdensome on free speech. See id.
In light of Madsen, an injunction issued under FACE will be upheld if it is precisely
drafted so that it does not burden more speech than necessary to serve a significant
governmental interest. See id. at 2530. A recently decided Eighth Circuit case upheld
certain provisions of. an injunction issued under FACE, finding constitutional: (1) a
prohibition on the use or threat of force, intimidation, interference, and physical
obstruction; (2) a 500-foot buffer zone surrounding the clinic; (3) restrictions on noise
levels when voicing First Amendment protected speech; and, (4) the nationwide scope of
the order. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 928-29. (8th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615). The court found that these restrictions burdened
no more speech than necessary to protect the patients and staff of reproductive health
facilities. See id. at 928; see also United States v. Lindgren, 883 F. Supp. 1321, 1333
(D.N.D. 1995) (issuing injunctive relief under FACE that ordered the defendant to keep
100 feet away from clinic and clinic employees, including employees' homes, after a finding
of threatening statements and physically obstructing clinic's driveway and private
sidewalk).
The Court, however, is revisiting the abortion "buffer zone" issue as it pertains to anti-
abortion protestors' First Amendment rights, recently hearing oral arguments in Pro-
Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
The Court is reviewing an injunction that established a fifteen-foot buffer zone
surrounding the clinic and prohibiting protestors from "sidewalk counseling" clinic patients
within the buffer zone, with the exception that two "counsellors" are allowed to enter the
buffer zone to counsel patients entering or leaving the clinic. Id. at 387. The Second
Circuit held that the injunction was content-neutral, and that its provisions did not burden
more speech than necessary to further the substantial governmental interests requiring the
issuance of the injunction. See id. at 393. The Court will determine under the Madsen
standard whether the injunction is an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment
rights. See Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 377.
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B). The court may also award attorneys fees and costs
for expert witnesses. See id.
85. See id.
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III. FEDERAL COURTS' RESPONSES TO CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO FACE
From its inception, FACE was challenged under the Constitution in
American Life League, Inc. v. Reno.86 Challenges in other federal courts
quickly followed.87 To date, district courts have explicitly examined
FACE's constitutionality in twelve cases. 88 The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits have subsequently upheld the constitutionality of
FACE.8 9
Opposition to FACE is predominantly based on several constitutional
arguments: FACE surpasses the range of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority;9° it infringes on fundamental First Amendment principles be-
cause it is a content-based statute;91 it suppresses some peaceful expres-
86. 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 55 (1995). The American Life League, Inc., which promotes activities "relating to the
human rights of persons born or unborn," conceded that its members interfere with abor-
tion providers and intimidate patients by attempting to persuade women not to undergo an
abortion procedure. Id. at 139-40. The organization stated, however, that it does not advo-
cate the use of violence to protest abortion. See id. at 139.
87. See supra note 14 (listing cases in which the constitutionality of FACE was
challenged).
88. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996); United States v. Scott,
919 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1996); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan.
1995); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995); United States v. Hill, 893
F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Fla. 1994); United States v. Dinwiddie, 885 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Mo.
1995), affd, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615);
United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied sub nom. Skott v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-
1523); United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994), affd sub nom. United
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S.
July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994); Cook v. Reno,
859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1994); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422
(S.D. Cal. 1994); American Life League, 855 F. Supp. at 137.
89. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1370; United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d
675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Skott v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-1523); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995); Woodall v.
Reno, 47 F.3d 656 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995); American Life League,
Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
90. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1373; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 919; Wilson, 73 F.3d at 684;
Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1519; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647; Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at
805; Scott, 919 F. Supp. at 78-79; Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1423; White, 893 F. Supp. at 1432;
Hill, 893 F. Supp. at 1036; Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 707; Council for Life Coalition, 856 F.
Supp. at 1431; see also infra notes 95-134 and accompanying text (examining Commerce
Clause challenges to FACE).
91. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374-75; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at
1518; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648; Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424; White, 893 F.
Supp. at 1435-36; Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 700-02; Cook, 859 F. Supp. at 1010; Councilfor Life
Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at 1427; see also infra notes 177-236, 278-323 and accompanying
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sive conduct;92 and finally, it is overbroad 93 and vague.94 The following
section will address only the allegation that Congress exceeded its Com-
merce Clause authority when enacting FACE, and the charge that FACE
chills free speech because its language is both overbroad and vague. A
full discussion of the argument that FACE violates the First Amendment,
because it is a content-based regulation and also restricts some types of
protected expressive conduct, is contained in Part V.
A. The Commerce Clause and its Application
1. Congress's Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate
Interstate Commerce
One of the constitutional challenges to FACE is that Congress lacked
the authority to pass the statute.95 Since 1937, the Court has affirmed
Congress's extensive regulation under the Commerce Clause, provided
that there is a rational basis for finding that the regulated activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. 96 Congress may regulate three cat-
text (discussing content-based regulations and applying appropriate First Amendment
analysis to FACE).
92. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1375; Woodall, 47 F.3d at 657; American Life League, 47
F.3d at 654; Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 820; Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424; White, 893 F.
Supp. at 1435-36; Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 700; Council for Life Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at
1428-29; see also infra notes 158-76, 260-332 and accompanying text (illustrating the proper
First Amendment methodology when a statute incidentally affects some protected expres-
sive conduct and applying such analysis to FACE).
93. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1518; Woodall, 47 F.3d at 657-58;
American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652; Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 802; Lucero, 895 F. Supp.
at 1424-25; White, 893 F. Supp. at 1437; Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 704; Council for Life Coali-
tion, 856 F. Supp. at 1428-29; see also infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (providing
the overbreadth doctrine and its application to FACE).
94. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1376-77; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at
1518; Woodall, 47 F.3d at 657-58; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652; Hoffrnan, 923 F.
Supp. at 802; Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424-25; White, 893 F. Supp. at 1437; Riely, 860 F.
Supp. at 704; Council for Life Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at 1428; see also infra notes 144-51
and accompanying text (discussing the void for vagueness doctrine and challenges that
FACE is representative).
95. See supra note 90 (citing cases where a Commerce Clause challenge to FACE has
been alleged).
96. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). Granting an enormous amount of
discretion and power to Congress, the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. held
that the regulation of activities that have "such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions" is within the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. Id. But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (rejecting a statute
as beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers because the link between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce was too attenuated).
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egories of behavior97 through its commerce power: (1) activities that use
the channels of interstate commerce; 98 (2) activities that involve instru-
mentalities of, or persons and things in; interstate commerce, even if the
impact originates from intrastate activities; 99 and (3) activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 10 Therefore, one way that a statute
enacted under the Commerce Clause is valid is if Congress rationally
finds that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
and that the means chosen are reasonably adapted to achieve permissible
ends.' 0 ' This "rational basis" test provides the proper standard of judicial
review when Congress exercises power under the Commerce Clause.' 2
Although Congress is not required to provide formal findings as to the
substantial effects a particular activity has on interstate commerce, such
findings assist judicial review when the connection to interstate com-
merce is ambiguous or challenged.' 3 If Congress finds that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, courts must defer to that finding,
provided that it is supported by a "rational basis."'0 4 A landmark Com-
merce Clause case recently decided by the Court, however, must be taken
into account when engaging in the rational basis test.0 5
United States v. Lopez' °6 dealt a sharp and surprising blow to Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause, 0 7 and must be taken into
97. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
98. See id. at 1629; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256-57 (upholding the
constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which regulated establishments
using goods and services that have travelled through the channels of interstate commerce).
99. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629; see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150
(1971) (noting that the second category includes protection of persons or things in inter-
state commerce).
100. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37-38
(upholding federal regulation of labor disputes under the Commerce Clause because
strikes or other disruptions could substantially burden interstate commerce despite the lo-
cal nature of the activities).
101. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276.
102. See id. at 276-77.
103. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (noting that although Congress is not required to
make specific findings in order to properly enact legislation, such findings are helpful for
courts when evaluating the "legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially
affected interstate commerce").
104. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,276
(1981).
105. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); infra notes 106-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing the impact of Lopez on Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
106. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
107. Several commentators have acknowledged the significance of Lopez. See Steven
G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United
States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 752, 752 (1995) (pronouncing Lopez a "revolutionary
and long overdue revival" of the constitutional principle that Congress has limited enumer-
ated power to legislate); Alan T. Dickey, Recent Development, United States v. Lopez:
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account when analyzing the Commerce Clause authority of Congress.'
In Lopez, the Court struck down a law banning the possession of a gun
within one thousand feet of a school as unconstitutional because the law
exceeded the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power.' 9 In order
for the statute to withstand the Court's scrutiny, it had to be determined
that Congress was properly regulating an activity under the Commerce
Clause, which rested upon whether a rational basis existed for concluding
that firearm possession in a school zone substantially affected interstate
commerce."
0
Neither the statute at issue in Lopez nor its legislative history con-
tained legislative findings regarding the interstate commercial effects of
gun possession in school zones."' Furthermore, the statute did not re-
quire the gun to have moved in the stream of interstate commerce. 12
Absent a congressional finding supporting a rational basis for federal reg-
The Supreme Court Reasserts The Commerce Clause as a Limit on the Powers of Congress,
70 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1225 (1996) (explaining that the opinion aims to rein in Congress's
expansive power to regulate under the Commerce Clause); John P. Frantz, Recent Devel-
opment, The Reemergence of the Commerce Clause as a Limit on Federal Power: United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 161 (1995) (advocating
that the Court in Lopez reaffirmed the Framer's intent of establishing a government of
enumerated powers).
108. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (questioning Congress's findings and implicitly limiting
Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause). Decisions on FACE's consti-
tutionality under the Commerce Clause that have been reached after Lopez have explicitly
discussed the impact of Lopez. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 920 (8th Cir.)
(finding that when Congress drafted FACE, it provided a causal link between the regulated
commercial conduct and interstate commerce), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996)
(No. 96-5615); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that
unlike the statute in Lopez, Congress made legitimate findings in FACE to support its
authority to legislate), cert. denied sub nom. Skott v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-1523); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting
that unlike the statute in Lopez, FACE's enactment was supported by a rational basis);
United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D. Conn. 1996) (rejecting the contention that
Lopez holds that Congress may only regulate commercial activities under the Commerce
Clause, and finding that unlike the statute in Lopez, FACE regulates a commercial activ-
ity); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that, unlike
the statute in Lopez, Congress made specific findings of the many ways in which the vio-
lence and obstruction impacting clinic patients, providers, and staff affected interstate
commerce).
109. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (holding that the Gun Free School Zone statute ex-
ceeded Congress's authority because it "neither regulates a commercial activity nor con-
tains a requirement that the gun possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce").
110. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The Court openly admitted that its precedent has
been less than clear when dealing with the third category of Commerce Clause power,
particularly as to the weight of the effect the regulated activity must have on interstate
commerce. See id. at 1630.
111. See id. at 1631.
112. See id.
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ulation of gun possession within one thousand feet of a school, the Court
in Lopez looked for a logical connection to interstate commerce that was
"visible to the naked eye." 113 Because no such connection was obvious,
the statute failed the rational basis test." 4 This decision pointedly sends
a message to Congress that the Court will no longer rubber-stamp an
exercise of Commerce Clause authority to enact legislation having a
questionable impact on interstate commerce, especially when Congress
regulates a purely intrastate activity and fails to make findings of the ac-
tivity's substantial effect on interstate commerce. 1 5 The Court made
clear, however, that it will look favorably upon legislative findings that
firmly establish that the activity Congress seeks to regulate is commercial
or economic in nature. 16
113. Id. at 1632.
114. See id. The government argued that possession of a gun within a school zone sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce through a "costs of crime" analysis. See id. The
argument is as follows: because the cost of crime in society is so high, insurance companies
filter the costs out to the nation. See id. In addition, violent crime inhibits interstate travel
to places with high crime rates. See id. Finally, the availability of guns near schools ham-
pers the educational process because children are afraid to go to school. See id. If a child
does manage to attend classes, the fear is not left at the schoolyard gate; instead it creeps
into the classroom learning environment and, as a result, the child cannot learn to his or
her fullest capacity. See id. This effect on children translates into low national productivity
and educational levels, stifling the nation's growth. See id.
The Court refused to find that the "costs of crime" analysis demonstrated a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, reasoning that if it found Commerce Clause authority in
Lopez, Congress effectively would be granted the authority to regulate almost every aspect
of a citizen's life that tangentially could be related to economic productivity. See id
115. See Dickey, supra note 107, at 1223 (maintaining that the Court's distinction be-
tween economic activity, which easily produces a more direct effect on interstate com-
merce, and noneconomic activity, which has a more indirect and subtle result, can be
viewed as "a new restatement" of Commerce Clause jurisprudence); Frantz, supra note
107, at 167-68 (declaring that the "clearest principle" gained from Lopez is that Congress
has near plenary power to regulate commercial activities).
116. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. Congress is still not required to make legislative
findings to establish its Commerce Clause authority. See id. ("Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on inter-
state commerce."); United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (stating that nothing in
the decision should be taken to infer that Congress must make concrete findings when
legislating under its Commerce Clause authority).
As recognized by the Supreme Court, the statute in Lopez did not contain any legisla-
tive findings linking the activity being regulated, possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a
school zone, to having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1631. The government's contention that the threat of gun possession in or near schools
suppresses the learning process, leading to a less educated population that consequently
cannot effectively compete in the national and international economy, is, at best, tenuous.
See id at 1632.
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2. A Proper Exercise of Commerce Clause Power
Congress's purported authority to enact FACE derives from the Com-
merce Clause1 17 and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 Con-
gress obtained its Commerce Clause authority to enact FACE from
category three, regulating an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce, by finding that the violent and obstructionist activities sur-
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
. . . . .).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by.
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). See supra note 49 (providing the
language of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment). Professor Laurence H. Tribe
testified, "by its terms... the fourteenth amendment restricts only State action, not purely
private conduct." Hearing, supra note 28, at 98 (statement of Professor Laurence H.
Tribe). He urged, however, that Congress has authority to regulate some private conduct
under the Amendment, "once Congress concludes that States and municipalities, acting
alone, will be unable to provide sufficient protection against private acts that threaten the
full enjoyment of Federal constitutional rights." Id. at 99. The court in United States v.
White, after quoting Professor Tribe's testimony and checking the congressional findings
that elucidated the inability of state and local governments to adequately respond to vio-
lence and obstructions surrounding reproductive health clinics, concluded that it appeared
that Congress had additional authority to enact FACE under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1434-35 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
In reviewing the Commerce Clause issue, most courts agreed that Congress had Com-
merce Clause authority to enact FACE and, therefore, did not reach the issue of whether
the power existed under the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76
F.3d 913, 921 n.4 (8th Cir.) (explaining that because it held that FACE was within Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority, it need not consider whether Congress also had the
authority to enact FACE under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment), petition for
cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d
642, 647 (4th Cir.) (finding proper Commerce Clause authority, and declining to address
the argument that Congress lacked authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
FACE), cert. denied, 116 U.S. 55 (1995); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424
(D. Kan. 1995) (same).
But see Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 819-20 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (finding that Con-
gress lacked the authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action, although former justices of
the Supreme Court have put forth the view that it does not); United States v. Wilson, 880
F. Supp. 621, 634-35 (E.D. Wis.) (interpreting Supreme Court precedent as strictly main-
taining that the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state conduct), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675
(7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Skott v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1996) (No. 95-1523). The district court in Wilson found that because FACE regulates pri-
vate conduct, "FACE is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 636; see also Katherine A. Hilber, Note, Constitutional
FACE-Off: Testing the Validity of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 72 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 143, 167 (1994) (asserting that Congress's authority to enact FACE
under the Fourteenth Amendment is questionable, because protected rights such as abor-
tion and interstate travel "may not be directly violated by the actions of the protestors ...
no rights [would] exist that are protect[able] under the Fourteenth Amendment in the
clinic context").
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rounding reproductive health clinics substantially affected interstate com-
merce.119 Through a series of legislative findings, Congress determined
that many women travel to different states to obtain abortions because
the clinics where they live have been subjected to clinic blockades, or few
abortion providers exist due to intimidation by protestors.120  Conse-
quently, women often travel across state lines to obtain abortions and are
then physically obstructed from entering a clinic. 2 ' Congress also found
that the interstate commercial activities of abortion clinics were adversely
affected by violent and obstructive activities.' 22 Thus, Congress con-
cluded that it had authority to enact FACE pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. 23
119. See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 724 (finding that the anti-abor-
tion activity forced patients to travel interstate to receive unimpeded access to reproduc-
tive health services, and that the conduct also interfered with the commercial activities of
clinic operators and their facilities). The government contends that it has power under
both the second and third categories of authority to regulate interstate commerce. Brief
for the United States as Appellee at 41-42, United States v. Hatch, sub nom. United States
v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26,
1996) (No. 96-141). The government has attested that FACE was properly enacted under
the power to protect persons or things in interstate commerce, which is located in the
second category. See id. Citing to congressional findings that many patients and providers
engage in interstate commerce for abortion services, and that medical supplies and equip-
ment are supplied from other states, the government advocated that these findings were
sufficient to support the application of the second category. See id. at 42.
At least two circuit courts have left open the possibility of congressional authority under
the second category of behavior: regulating the instrumentalities of commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 919-20; Wilson, 73 F.3d at 680.
The Eighth Circuit in Dinwiddie found that FACE's protection of patients and staff, who
moved "in interstate commerce" to obtain and provide abortions, was proper under Con-
gress's authority to protect persons and things in interstate commerce, "even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities." 76 F.3d at 919-20 (quoting United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629).
120. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31; see also Hearing, supra note 28, at 97
(statement of Laurence H. Tribe) ("It is indisputable that clinics that provide abortions
necessarily operate within the stream of interstate commerce and purchase goods and serv-
ices that move in interstate commerce.").
121. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,275 (1993) (plurality
opinion) (accepting the district court's finding that a substantial number of women travel
interstate to reach abortion clinics, but finding it insufficient to support a claim under
§ 1985(3) for private interference with a constitutional right to interstate travel); SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 31; Hearing, supra note 28, at 16 (statement of Attorney General
Janet Reno) (maintaining that "it is well-established" that many reproductive health clinics
serve "significant numbers" of out-of-state patients).
122. See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 724; supra notes 2-10 and ac-
companying text (detailing the effect of violence and blockades perpetrated against abor-
tion providers and patients).
123. See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 724; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 3-17.
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a. FACE Survives the Rational Basis Test
Courts have found that FACE withstands the first prong of the rational
basis test,124 even in light of Lopez. 125 Congress carefully examined
clinic entrance blockades and the surrounding violence, and rationally de-
termined that the problem warranted federal legislation to protect the
constitutional rights of women, public health and safety, and interstate
commerce. 126 In stark contrast to the statute in Lopez, FACE contains
legislative findings of the substantial effect that violent anti-abortion ac-
tivity has on interstate commerce. 27 These congressional findings pro-
124. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1379; U.S. v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th Cir.
1996); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 681-83 (7th Cir. 1995); American Life League,
Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.) (finding that Congress "rationally concluded that
the activity regulated by FACE affects interstate commerce"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55
(1995).
125. See Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding Congress's
Commerce Clause power to pass FACE after examining the Lopez decision, and finding
that FACE is constitutional because of extensive legislative findings linking the regulated
violent anti-abortion activity and clinic blockades to interstate commerce); United States v.
White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1433-34 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that Congress's authority to
pass FACE was untouched after Lopez).
But see Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 819 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (finding FACE uncon-
stitutional on Commerce Clause grounds). The court found that the statutes in Lopez and
FACE were extremely similar, in that they both attempted to regulate conduct that was
neither commercial nor economic in nature. See id. at 818. The court reasoned that the
Court in Lopez held that congressional authority to regulate activity that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce is limited to commercial or economic activities. See id. The
court dismissed congressional findings that anti-abortion protests had substantially affected
the reproductive health business and held that FACE was unconstitutional. See id. at 816,
819.
In United States v. Wilson, the district court employed the same reasoning. 880 F. Supp.
621, 630-33 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995). In a subsequent appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision because the district court failed to
address whether the regulated activities substantially affected interstate commerce. Wil-
son, 73 F.3d at 681. By failing to do so, and by refusing to defer to Congress's finding
under the rational basis test to Congress's findings, the district court created "a less defer-
ential standard." Id. The Court of Appeals determined that this standard contradicted
Supreme Court precedent. See id.
126. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-21; see also American Life League, 47
F.3d at 647. A district court in California tactfully highlighted a major defect of the Wilson
district court decision, which held that Congress had exceeded Commerce Clause author-
ity, by stating: "with all due respect, it does appear that the [Wilson] court substituted its
own findings for those of Congress." United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1434 (C.D.
Cal. 1995). It is not appropriate, the court explained, to ignore Congress's "institutional
competence" in locating and addressing problems that it has decided are nationwide in
scope and consequently are in need of federal attention. Id.
127. See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 724 (finding that violent,
threatening, and destructive conduct engaged in by anti-abortion activists interferes with
interstate commercial activities of abortion clinic providers); Hearing, supra note 28, at 16-
17 (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno) (emphasizing that providing abortion serv-
ices is commerce and the activities engaged in by anti-abortion groups have directly af-
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vide a rational basis for the conclusion that the activity FACE regulates,
the physical safety of those involved in providing and receiving reproduc-
tive health services, is commercial and interstate in nature. 28 Moreover,
the legislative record compiled by Congress supports its summary that
"violence, threats of force, and physical obstructions aimed at persons
seeking or providing reproductive health services" substantially affect in-
terstate commerce. 29
FACE also satisfies the second component of the rational basis test by
implementing a reasonable response to the problem by regulating,
through a motive requirement, only the types of violent and obstructive
conduct that Congress found affected interstate commerce, while still al-
fected these services); supra notes 2-11, 68 and accompanying text (describing the outbreak
of violence directed at clinics and their staff and providing illustrations of Congress's find-
ings that the types of anti-abortion activity surrounding reproductive health clinics impact
clinic business and commercial operations).
128. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 684 (supporting the proposition that FACE is distinguish-
able because Congress made specific findings connecting the regulated activity to interstate
commerce); Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 (accepting Congress's findings that FACE regulates
activity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce); see also supra note 68 and accom-
panying text (providing Congress's findings that illustrate the types of activity surrounding
reproductive health clinics which substantially affect interstate commerce).
Furthermore, Congress found that women engage in interstate travel to receive repro-
ductive health services. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 703; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 31; Hearing, supra note 28, at 16 (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno)
(noting that a federal district court in Kansas found that about forty-four percent of pa-
tients at a clinic were non-residents, and that a federal district court in Virginia found that
a substantial number of patients had crossed state lines to obtain abortion services).
But see Hilber, supra note 118, at 164-65 (stating that the activity that FACE proscribes
is almost entirely intrastate in nature, and is already regulated by the states as either crimi-
nal or tortious conduct); cf Frantz, supra note 107, at 164 (stating that the statute in Lopez
futilely attempted to regulate actions that are "purely criminal in nature and not tied to
commerce or economic enterprise of any sort").
129. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 703-07; SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-
17, 31-32; supra notes 2-11, 68, and accompanying text (discussing legislative findings con-
necting the types of conduct engaged in by anti-abortion activists to a detrimental eco-
nomic effect experienced by clinics, thereby substantially affecting interstate commerce);
see also American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647. The Fourth Circuit supported its finding of
Congress's rational basis by noting that Dr. Gunn, who was murdered by an anti-abortion
activist in 1993, provided abortion services in several states, that medical supplies often
move in interstate commerce, and that clinics often are shut down due to blockades and
destruction of property. See id.
The intimidation and violence has taken a noticeable toll on the number of doctors and
clinics willing to perform abortions. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 705. The House
found that "[tihe facts are that only 17 percent of U.S. counties have an abortion provider
and that clinic owners face a shortage of doctors willing to perform abortions." Id. In-
deed, as a direct result of anti-abortion tactics such as blockades, invasions, and sabotage,
clinics are forced to curtail or completely cease providing abortion services. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
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lowing ample avenues for peaceful demonstrations. 130 Courts have con-
cluded that the regulatory means that Congress chose were well-suited to
accomplish the permissible ends of FACE:' 3 ' (1) protecting the flow of
commerce; (2) protecting patient access to reproductive health services;
(3) protecting women's constitutional right to obtain an abortion; (4) pro-
tecting clinic employees' safety; and (5) protecting clinics from damage
and sabotage. 32 Thus, FACE's specific congressional findings linking the
prohibited conduct's effect on interstate commerce enabled the statute to
survive rational basis review.133 In sum, the judicial consensus is that
FACE's criminal and civil penalties are reasonably adapted to meet the
goal of preventing violent behavior aimed at abortion providers and the
obstructive tactics that block access to clinic entrances.' 34
B. FACE is Neither an Overbroad Nor Vague Statute
FACE is further challenged as both overbroad and vague, and there-
fore unconstitutional because of its "chilling effect" on free speech. 35 A
130. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.) (finding Con-
gress chose regulatory means which were reasonably adapted to deter violent and obstruc-
tive activities aimed at abortion clinics, providers, and patients), cert. denied., 116 S. Ct. 55(1995). See generally supra notes 125-29, and infra notes 131-34 (providing cases that find
Congress has proper Commerce Clause authority to enact FACE).
131. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647 (recognizing that the civil remedies and
criminal penalties are specifically intended and tailored to prevent the violent, obstructive,
and destructive conduct that prompted Congress to enact FACE).
132. See id. (finding that Congress's legitimate interests in passing FACE and the means
by which it crafted the legislation provide a rational basis for Congress's Commerce Clause
authority).
133. See id. The district court in United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Fla.
1994), also found persuasive Congress's conclusion that uniform legislation was needed
because "'a patchwork of State and local laws is inherently inadequate to address what is a
nationwide, interstate phenomenon."' Id. at 1037 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 2,
at 19).
134. As stated by Chief Judge Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, "[Tihis is a statute that really does seek to remove a significant obstruc-
tion, in rather a literal sense, to the free movement of persons and goods across state
lines." United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141).
135. The overbreadth and vagueness arguments asserted by opponents of FACE are
that "'[tihousands of persons who daily engage in peaceful activities around abortion clin-
ics now risk arrest"' because: (1) FACE proscribes too much protected speech; and (2) the
conduct prohibited by FACE is not clear to the average person and therefore will lead to
confusion about what is protected. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652-53 (quoting Brief
for Appellants at 29). Courts faced with these constitutional challenges do not agree. See
Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1377 (finding that FACE is not void for vagueness); United States v.
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 924 (8th Cir.) (holding that FACE is neither overbroad in its appli-
cation nor are its terms vague), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615);
American Life League, 47 F.3d at 653 (holding that FACE is constitutional because it
"speaks in clear common words" and provides definitions for important terms); Council
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chilling effect may occur when people are intimidated by a statute be-
cause they may not understand what is and is not prohibited, and conse-
quently forego exercising protected speech and expressive conduct.'
36
Because the interests in prohibiting a chilling effect on free speech are
much the same in overbroad statutes as in vague statutes, courts tend to
analyze the doctrines together.1 37 The Supreme Court has stated that
when examining both challenges, however, courts should consider the
overbreadth argument first, and then inquire whether the statute is un-
constitutionally vague. 138
1. No Real and Substantial Overbreadth
A statute will be held void on its face for overbreadth if it "does not
aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of State control but ....
sweeps within its ambit other activities" that are protected by the First
Amendment guarantees of free speech or freedom of association.
39
When expressive conduct and not just pure speech is involved, "the over-
breadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' 140 The Supreme
Court has noted that the rationale behind the dual requirements of "real"
for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that FACE is
not unconstitutionally vague because key terms are defined with specificity).
136. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 229 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explain-
ing that a chilling effect prevents people from either speaking or acting because of fear of
violating the regulation). Justice Marshall's dissent in Arnett propounded upon the evils of
an unconstitutionally overbroad or vague statute. See id. at 227-31. He described such a
statute as a Sword of Damocles, the value of which "is that it hangs-not that it drops." Id.
at 231. He further recognized that the unusual standing application in such a case "is not
on the individual actor before the court but on others who may forego protected activity
rather than run afoul of the statute's proscriptions." Id. at 229; see also Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 852-58 (1970) (examining the
chilling effect rationale behind overbreadth and vagueness jurisprudence) [hereinafter
Overbreadth Doctrine].
137. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (reviewing a statute that regu-
lated expression and observing that when vagueness and overbreadth are combined, "the
hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious [First Amendment] rights may
be critical").
138. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494-95 (1982). The Court announced that when dealing with both facial challenges to a
statute, determining whether a statute is substantially overbroad is the first step. See id. at
494. If the statute is not overbroad, then the examination should continue as to whether
the statute is impermissibly vague. See id. at 494-95.
139. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
140. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973); see Board of Airport Comm'rs v.
Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987) (finding that a statute regulating disruptive
expressive conduct in the Los Angeles airport terminal was overbroad because it prohib-
ited all free speech activity in the terminal including talking, reading, and wearing slogans
on buttons-whether or not it was disruptive).
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and "substantial" overbreadth is that because the doctrine itself is such
"strong medicine" it should not be used lightly to invalidate a statute. 14 1
FACE's regulation of expressive conduct cannot be construed as real
and substantially overbroad because the statute's proscription is narrowly
limited, by only prohibiting physical obstruction with the intent to injure,
intimidate, or interfere with a person who is either providing or obtaining
reproductive health services.' 4 2 Some courts simply find that because
FACE is directed at both unprotected conduct and speech, such as physi-
cal obstruction or threats, the First Amendment interests in curbing over-
breadth are not even implicated.' 43 Just because the statute withstands
141. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. The Court recognized that the overbreadth doctrine
should be used as a last resort and will not be employed "when a limiting construction has
been or could be placed on the challenged statute." Id.; see also Overbreadth Doctrine,
supra note 136, at 918. The author asserts that the application of substantial overbreadth
depends on the type of statute at issue, and discerns three types of overbroad statutes that
have First Amendment considerations. See id. The first category contains "censorial" stat-
utes that limit certain viewpoints on matters of public debate; the second group encom-
passes "inhibitory" statutes, "which impinge on expressive and associational conduct but
whose impact tends to be neutral as to viewpoints sought to be advocated;" and finally,
"remedial" statutes that restrict certain free speech within the concerns of the First
Amendment. Id. The author concludes that the Court is less tolerant of censorial laws, for
instance, criminal syndicalism laws, and therefore such a regulation does not need to be as
real and substantially overbroad as an inhibitory law, for example, libel, to be struck down.
See id. A remedial statute is often given the most deference; examples are lobbying and
campaign contribution limitations. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 83, § 16.8, at 946
(explaining that the regulation in Broadrick, which withstood an overbreadth challenge
was a remedial law, in that it regulated the political activities of state employees).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994); see American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,
653 (4th Cir.) (observing that FACE was not substantially overbroad "in relation to its
legitimate scope of outlawing violence and barriers to access"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55
(1995); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (recognizing that
FACE's regulation of physical obstruction is narrowly tailored).
143. See Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 704 (D. Ariz. 1994) (maintaining that neither
physical obstruction of access to a building, nor threats of bodily harm are protected
speech and therefore that FACE is not unconstitutionally overbroad); Council for Life
Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that plaintiffs did not
establish that FACE reached a "substantial amount of protected conduct"); see also infra
notes 208-10 (threats), 267-68 (physical obstruction) and accompanying text (discussing
Court precedent that illustrates that threats of force and physical obstruction are not pro-
tected conduct or speech under the First Amendment). But see Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F.
Supp. 791, 802-03 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (pronouncing FACE overbroad). In Hoffman, the
court found that FACE violated the First Amendment because it "prohibits speech that is
'intimidating' to someone because it creates a 'reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to
him-or herself or another,' such that the application of the statute hinges on the subjective
reaction that speech elicits from its listener and is therefore unconstitutional." Id. The
district court further asserted that FACE's prohibition against threats that create a reason-
able apprehension of bodily harm in an individual impermissibly prohibited speech outside
the category of "fighting words." Id. Because FACE restricts some protected free speech,
it is therefore unconstitutionally overbroad. See id.; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen &
Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful Constitutionality of the Clinic Access Bill, 1 VA. J.
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an overbreadth challenge, however, does not ensure it is not void for
vagueness.
2. Providing Clear Definitional Standards of Prohibited Conduct
A statute is void for vagueness from a due process perspective if a per-
son of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning.'" From a First
Amendment vantage, the void for vagueness doctrine implicates not only
the due process concepts of fair notice and warning, but also clear guide-
lines to ensure non-discriminatory enforcement. 145 In short, the void for
vagueness doctrine protects both due process and free speech rights. 46
Soc. POL'Y & L. 261, 276 (1994) (stating that FACE's language substantially limits pro-
tected speech and expressive conduct, such as face-to-face persuasion and peaceful picket-
ing, which thereby severely chills free speech and is, consequently, overbroad). The court
in Riely addressed the line of argument advanced by Paulsen & McConnell, and insisted
that no provision of FACE "could possibly be construed to prohibit mere 'sidewalk coun-
seling"' and that furthermore, the only type of persuasion prohibited by FACE is threat of
bodily harm. 860 F. Supp. at 704. In short, FACE presents no "real" risk of substantial
overbreadth. Id.
One court has also posited that even if FACE reaches expressive activity, it is an allowa-
ble regulation of the time, place, and manner of specific conduct. See United States v.
Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 865-66 (E.D. Wis. 1994), affd sub nom. United States v. Soderna,
82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No.
96-141). Supreme Court precedent allows for reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions of protected speech and expressive conduct as long as the restrictions are "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech .... narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984); see supra note 83 (providing a cursory time, place, and manner discussion).
Because the court found that FACE's regulation of expressive conduct was a permissible
time, place, and manner restriction, the court explained that "FACE is not only not 'sub-
stantially' overbroad, it is not overbroad at all." Brock, 863 F. Supp. at 866.
144. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that crimi-
nal statutes must be clear enough to inform the public of the exact types of conduct which
are prohibited).
145. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (holding that a flag-misuse stat-
ute is void for vagueness because the phrase "treats contemptuously" does not create an
ascertainable standard of conduct either for the citizen who must comply or the public
official who must enforce); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 83, § 16.9, at 950 (explaining
that when there are no clear standards of enforcement, there is a danger of discriminatory
and selective enforcement, which is especially dangerous when a fundamental right is in-
volved); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rnv.
67, 76-77 (1960) (observing that a substantial problem, in addition to fair notice and warn-
ing, and chilling free speech, may occur with a vague statute, such that language may em-
power "an administrative or executive authority to fix, by unmistakably specific action"
whether particular conduct as defined is unlawful) [hereinafter Vagueness Doctrine].
146. See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573 (recognizing that when the First Amendment is at
issue, the void for vagueness doctrine "demands a greater degree of specificity"); Connally,
269 U.S. at 391 (maintaining that when a criminal statute's terms are too vague, the due
process requirement of fair notice is violated); Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 145, at 75-78
(recognizing that protecting First Amendment and other Bill of Rights freedoms are im-
19961
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Congress specifically defined FACE's key terms, including "interfere
with," "intimidate," and "physical obstruction.' ' 147 These terms are prev-
alent in the United States Code and are ones that the Supreme Court has
not held unconstitutionally vague 148 or overbroad.149 Because of the
careful drafting and definitions provided in the statute, a person of ordi-
nary intelligence could read FACE and understand its meaning and appli-
cation.15 0 There is no "chilling" of free speech when ordinary people of
average intelligence can understand the meaning of FACE's operative
words, which have been defined and repeatedly used in state and federal
statutes that have been upheld as constitutional, and thus can compre-
plicit in, but not limited to, the void-for-vagueness doctrine; noting that two different types
of void-for-vagueness decisions exist: (1) lack of fair warning or notice of prohibited con-
duct; and (2) the threat that the vagueness of the statute may suppress free speech).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(2),(3),(4); see supra note 73 (providing FACE's definition of
important terms).
148. The statute at issue in Cameron v. Johnson prohibited picketing that obstructed or
unreasonably interfered with ingress or egress to any county courthouse. 390 U.S. 611, 616
(1968). The Court observed that the word "unreasonably" "is a widely used and well un-
derstood word, and clearly so when juxtaposed with 'obstruct' and 'interfere."' Id. In
concert with the Court's finding in Cameron, Congress defined physical obstruction under
FACE as "rendering impassable ingress or egress from a facility.., or rendering passage to
or from such a facility.., unreasonably difficult or hazardous." 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(4). The
Seventh Circuit found that the "unreasonably difficult" language of FACE was similar
enough to "unreasonably interfere" in Cameron to uphold FACE as not void for vague-
ness. Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1376.
149. See Cameron, 390 U.S. at 616 (finding that the words "obstruct," "interfere," and
"unreasonably" are words that can be commonly understood and therefore are not over-
broad or vague); United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1987) (examining
the Fair Housing Act's terminology of "force" and "threat of force" and concluding that
these words are not vague or overbroad); see also United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851,
866 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (noting that most of FACE's proscribed conduct terminology has
already been challenged and upheld in other statutes), affd sub nom. United States v.
Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26,
1996) (No. 96-141); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (S.D. Cal.
1994) (finding that the Supreme Court has previously examined many important terms that
are used in FACE, such as "intimidate," "interfere," and "physical obstruction," and did
not find them unconstitutionally vague); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp.
137, 142 (E.D. Va. 1994) (remarking that most of FACE's operative words come from
statutes which have been upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional), affd, 47 F.3d
642, 648-51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
150. See Brock, 863 F. Supp. at 866 (asserting that FACE gives fair notice and warning
to the public as to what conduct is prohibited).
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hend the type of conduct prohibited.15' Therefore, courts find that FACE
is neither unconstitutionally vague 52 nor overbroad. 53
IV. "CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW .. . ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM
OF SPEECH ......
Beginning with its journey through Congress, the most contentious
constitutional issue surrounding FACE is that it violates the First Amend-
ment. 54 Since FACE became law, courts have grappled with whether
FACE is facially unconstitutional because it regulates free speech based
on a desire to quell the pro-life message. 55 Another concern addressed
151. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 653 (stating that Congress defined the meanings
of prohibited conduct so that the public should understand what activities are unlawful).
The district court in American Life League pointed out that FACE proscribes conduct that
is already prohibited by state and local laws, such as trespass and assault. See 855 F. Supp.
137, 143 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 47 F.3d 642, 652-3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55
(1995). The court bluntly stated: "Without ambiguity there is no chill. Protestors who are
not chilled by the existing laws against trespass and assault could not reasonably be chilled
by this Act." Id.; see supra notes 148-49 (illustrating statutory language that survived over-
breadth and void for vagueness challenges). But see Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 143,
at 278 (explaining that reliance on other statutes may be misplaced and misguided, because
FACE "embraces a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct with relation
to its sweep in a way that these other statutes may well not").
152. See generally supra note 147-51 (illustrating cases where FACE's language and ter-
minology has been held by courts to be not unconstitutionally vague).
153. See generally supra note 142-43 (providing cases where FACE was upheld as not
unconstitutionally overbroad with the exception of one district court case).
154. See Hearing, supra note 28, at 117-21 (statement of Carol Crossed, American Fam-
ily Association) (expressing the opinion that FACE discriminatorily targets pro-life protes-
tors' viewpoint and prohibits civil disobedience); 140 CONG. REc. S5599 (daily ed. May 12,
1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (insisting that FACE "clearly masks a hostility to the pro-
life viewpoint," which is essentially discrimination that is inconsistent with the First
Amendment guarantees of free speech). But see SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 28-30
(defending FACE as a statute fully consistent with First Amendment principles and
Supreme Court precedent).
155. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1374-76 (7th Cir.) (finding that FACE
is not a viewpoint-based regulation), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26,
1996) (No. 96-141); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 921-23 (8th Cir.) (holding that
FACE is not a viewpoint-based regulation of speech), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6,
1996) (No. 96-5615); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding
FACE under the First Amendment according to the rationale of the Fourth Circuit in
American Life League); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648-51 (4th Cir.)
(maintaining that FACE is viewpoint-neutral), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); United
States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995) (same); United States v. White,
893 F. Supp. 1423, 1435-36 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 701-03
(D. Ariz. 1994) (finding that FACE regulates unprotected speech and is not a viewpoint-
based regulation); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (W.D. La. 1994) (holding that
FACE regulates unprotected conduct, and is not a viewpoint restriction); Council for Life
Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1427-28 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (same). But see Hoffman v.
Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 822 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (finding FACE's prohibition of threats of
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by courts is that FACE violates the First Amendment because it may inci-
dentally affect peaceful, yet physically obstructive, conduct. 156 When
faced with such First Amendment challenges, however, courts sometimes
stumble through the appropriate steps, jumble what should be separate
analytic points, and imprecisely apply terminology. 157 To determine how
courts should properly address all arguments that FACE violates the
guarantees of the First Amendment, a proper foundation of Supreme
Court First Amendment precedent must first be laid. Because FACE pri-
marily regulates conduct, that will be the appropriate starting point of
discussion.
A. The Appropriate First Amendment Analysis When Examining a
Regulation of Conduct
The First Amendment broadly establishes the right of all citizens to
engage in free speech without governmental interference. 58 First
Amendment protection is not limited to the spoken or written word,
however.' 59 It may extend to certain types of conduct depending on the
force unconstitutional because the application of the statute "hinges on the subjective reac-
tion that speech elicits from its listener").
156. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374-75 (finding that FACE does not infringe upon con-
duct protected by the First Amendment); Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921 (maintaining that
FACE "easily satisfies" the O'Brien expressive conduct test); Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521 (up-
holding FACE under the First Amendment according to the rationale of the Fourth Circuit
in American Life League); American Life League, 47 F.3d at 651-52 (stating that FACE
survives the O'Brien examination of expressive conduct); Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424
(same); White, 893 F. Supp. at 1436-37 (finding that FACE passes the O'Brien examination
for expressive conduct); Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 700 (same); Cook, 859 F. Supp. at 1010
(stating that FACE regulates unprotected violent conduct); Council for Life Coalition, 856
F. Supp. at 1226-27 (same).
157. See infra notes 237-59 and accompanying text (describing how some courts confuse
First Amendment methodology and terminology when examining FACE).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
The ideal behind the First Amendment is one of spirited public debate. See New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (advocating that discussion of issues important
to the public should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open"); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (expounding that there must be freedom
to express one's views so that a competition of ideas results, and consequently, only the
best ideas will survive).
159. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (observing that although the text of
the First Amendment "literally forbids the abridgement of only 'speech,"' Supreme Court
precedent has extended the protection to certain expressive conduct); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 826 (2d ed. 1988) (locating the origin
of treating some conduct as speech in the 1940's labor picketing cases).
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intent of the actor and the circumstances surrounding the actor's
conduct.' 60
1. The Spence Test: Determining Whether Conduct is Expressive
In Spence v. Washington,'161 the Supreme Court developed a two-part
test to determine when conduct possesses enough communicative ele-
ments to elevate it to the level of expressive or speech-related conduct,
and thus implicate the First Amendment.162 The first question is whether
there is "an intent to convey a particularized message" and second,
whether there is a great likelihood under the surrounding circumstances
"that the message would be understood by those who view[ ] it.' 63 If
conduct fails this test, it is not speech-related, and there simply is no First
Amendment issue."6 Certain conduct, such as violent acts or physical
obstruction, falls under the category of unprotected conduct no matter
what type of communicative expression motivates the action, and may be
regulated as outside the scope and purpose of the First Amendment.' 6
5
160. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (accepting that particular conduct may be "'suffi-
ciently imbued with elements of communication"' so that it falls under the protection of
the First Amendment) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)); Spence,
418 U.S. at 410-11 (acknowledging that when certain conduct has a significant amount of
communication motivating the act, the First Amendment is implicated).
161. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
162. See id. at 410-11.
163. Id In Spence, the placement of a peace sign on an American flag hung upside
down was found to be speech-related conduct, in part because it was "roughly simultane-
ous with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent state trag-
edy." Id. at 410. The wearing of black armbands in school during the Vietnam war is
another example of conduct held to possess sufficient communicative elements; because it
conveyed the wearer's dissatisfaction with the government's Vietnam policy, it was found
to be expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
164. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting the premise that
all conduct that is used to express an idea or message will be found to be expressive and
thereby protected under the First Amendment).
165. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (stressing that violence is not
protected under the guise of free speech); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 916 (1982) ("The First Amendment does not protect violence .... The use of weapons,
gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the guise of 'advo-
cacy."') (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring));
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (upholding a statute that prohibited picket-
ing that physically obstructed the entrances of courthouses, because this "'activity bears no
relationship to the freedom to... distribute information or opinion"') (quoting Schneider
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
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2. Evaluating Expressive Conduct Under
United States v. O'Brien
When a statute regulates conduct that meets the two-part Spence test,
and therefore is expressive conduct, courts engage in the analysis devel-
oped in United States v. O'Brien'66 to evaluate whether the regulation
unconstitutionally infringes upon the First Amendment. 167 Under the
four-pronged O'Brien test, a court must determine if the statute: (1) was
enacted pursuant to valid congressional power; (2) furthers a substantial
governmental interest; (3) is unrelated to the suppression of free speech;
and, (4) affects the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms
no more than necessary.
168
As a threshold matter, the implied and unstated launching point for
courts in an O'Brien type analysis is step three: whether government's
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.169 The impor-
tance of this level of analysis is illustrated by the underlying principle of
First Amendment jurisprudence that the government is greatly restricted
in regulating conduct either because of the content of its expressive ele-
ments170 or because of the communicative impact the speech-related con-
duct may have on the public.' 71
166. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
167. See id. at 376. O'Brien was a Vietnam protestor who violated a federal statute that
prohibited the burning of one's draft card, an act which O'Brien maintained was "symbolic
speech." Id. The Court did not accept the precept that all conduct engaged in to convey a
message is permissible under the First Amendment. See id. Instead, the Court recognized
that Congress often has substantial governmental interests in regulating conduct that has
an expressive element. See id.
168. See id. at 377.
169. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (stating that the Court primarily
focuses on the component of the O'Brien test that addresses whether the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18
(1971) (insisting that the regulation at issue "rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the
words Cohen used to convey his message to the public" and therefore, finding that the
regulation was not unrelated to free speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (finding that the school's regulation was aimed at punishing
opinion, and not at containing disruptive action, and thereby tacitly discounted the rest of
the O'Brien test as not applicable).
170. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
171. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 229 (1983). Professor Stone distinguishes
between government's disagreement with a particular viewpoint, which the author catego-
rizes as improper motivation, and government's concern over the impact of the speech,
which the author translates as "paternalistic justification": a concern that others will accept
and adhere to the speaker's viewpoint. Id. "Paternalistic justification" can be rebutted by
a showing that the regulation falls under a category of unprotected speech, or if the gov-
ernment can show it has compelling reasons unrelated to paternalism behind the statute.
Id. Improper motive, on the other hand, is "by definition per se illegitimate." Id.
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Congressional purpose is crucial in determining whether government's
interest in adopting a restriction on conduct was "unrelated to the sup-
pression of free speech." '172 Consequently, courts examine whether the
regulation furthers legitimate goals unrelated to the subject matter,
speaker, or viewpoint of the speech that underlies the conduct.' 73 If the
court determines that the government has regulated conduct for reasons
unrelated to speech, the statute will pass the third component of O'Brien
and the inquiry then focuses on the other three elements, which are more
easily satisfied."7 Where all four elements are met, a statute will be up-
held as a constitutional content-neutral regulation regardless of the inci-
dental restrictions on speech-related conduct. 175  If the government
cannot bear its burden of showing that the regulation is unrelated to the
message behind the affected conduct, there is no need for further inquiry
under O'Brien; the statute will be treated and examined as if it regulates
"pure speech.' 76
172. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (recognizing that in deter-
mining content neutrality, government's purpose is paramount); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383
(explaining that an inquiry into congressional purpose is necessary when there is an allega-
tion of illicit congressional motive).
173. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-6, at 821-22 (finding
that often the Court will uphold the constitutionality of a statute "only after finding that
the legislature has properly weighed its costs and benefits: where an illicit reason has
played a substantial role in the legislature's deliberations, it may be reasonably said that
the decisional calculus has been impermissibly skewed").
174. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 (pronouncing the leniency of the O'Brien test, and
that consequently, the Court limits the applicability of the test to cases where "'the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression"') (quoting O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 377).
175. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984);
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Court in Clark found that a government regulation prohibit-
ing camping and overnight sleeping in some federal parks withstood the O'Brien analysis,
and was therefore valid, even though the statute incidentally affected those who wished to
engage in the prohibited conduct to effectuate political protest of the plight of the home-
less. See Clark, at 298-99.
176. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974) (explaining that because gov-
ernment could not advance a valid interest unrelated to expression in defense of a flag
desecration regulation, the O'Brien test was inapplicable because one of the four necessary
steps had failed); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971). After the Court in Cohen
quickly decided that the regulation targeted the message and not Cohen's conduct, the
Court advanced to a pure speech analysis. See id. at 19; accord Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 406-07 (1989); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969).
For purposes of this Comment, "pure speech" connotes verbal expression, which is to be
distinguished from conduct with communicative elements, what this Comment refers to as
"speech-related conduct" or "expressive conduct."
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B. Presumptively Invalid: Content-Based Regulations of Pure Speech
There are two different avenues to reach a First Amendment pure
speech analysis. First, as discussed immediately above, a statute may reg-
ulate expressive, non-verbal conduct for reasons related to the subject
matter, speaker, or viewpoint of the speech sought to be communicated
by the conduct. 177 The other avenue is that the behavior regulated is
itself verbal speech, such as threats of force.' 78 In either situation, the
regulation is prohibiting or restricting a person's speech or expressive
conduct because of disapproval of the consequential communicative im-
pact of the words on the listener.179
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid' 80 as violating a
fundamental underlying principle of the First Amendment that govern-
ment should not limit debate on matters of public interest or promote its
own viewpoint through content regulation. 181 Not surprisingly, the free-
177. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06 (stating that a regulation prohibiting the wearing of
black armbands in a public school was actually regulating the speech behind the conduct,
namely the protestation of the Vietnam War); see also supra notes 169-74 and accompany-
ing text (discussing O'Brien's third prong, which inquires whether government's motiva-
tion in regulating conduct is unrelated to the speech that motivates the behavior).
178. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705-06 (1969) (involving a federal statute
prohibiting any person from "knowingly and willfully... [making] any threat to take the
life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States" (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 871(a)) (alterations in original); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942)(examining a regulation, inter alia, that prohibited any person from addressing another
with offensive, derisive, or annoying words).
179. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining that content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid). Content-based regulations will be examined
under what has been dubbed by Professor Laurence Tribe a "track one" analysis. TRIBE,
supra note 159, § 12-2, at 791. As explained by Professor Tribe, if a regulation falls under
track one, the government must be able to show either that the regulation fits into an
unprotected category of speech, or that the regulation is necessary to meet a compelling
state interest. See id. at 833. Track one is to be distinguished from "track two" situations
that occur when government regulations are not based on the communicative impact or
content of the speech, but instead on the noncommunicative impact of the action. See id.
at 792. Track two cases are beyond the scope of this Comment and are not addressed
except briefly in note 83, addressing injunctive relief and the appropriate standard of anal-
ysis imposed on an injunction issued pursuant to FACE.
180. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
181. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25. The Cohen Court in dicta reaffirms the idea that
First Amendment freedoms should not be tampered with lightly. See id. The Court elo-
quently combines the vision of a free market place of ideas and the political system of
democracy that this country was founded upon:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours ... designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of
such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect
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dom of expression has never been found to be absolute. 82 Conse-
quently, some content-based regulations are permissible under the First
Amendment: either if the regulation falls within narrowly defined classes
of speech traditionally found outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment, 83 or, in the case of a regulation that discriminates against a partic-
ular subject matter, speaker, or viewpoint, if the government can prove
that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling interest and is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end. 84
1. Categories of Unprotected Speech
There are a few limited categories of pure speech that have been ex-
cluded from the First Amendment prohibition on content-based regula-
tions. 85 Some categories of unprotected speech, such as defamation 8 6
polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
Id.
182. See RA.V., 505 U.S. at 387 (recognizing that even the prohibition against content
discrimination has exceptions); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (stating that the
First Amendment has never been viewed as an absolute guarantee that all speech is pro-
tected); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571 (restating that the right of free speech "is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances").
183. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (providing examples of classes or forms of speech
that may be prevented consistently with the First Amendment); see also infra notes 185-205
and accompanying text (providing a full discussion of the categories of speech that may be
regulated or prohibited as outside the protection of the First Amendment).
184. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972) (explaining that
because a city ordinance treated one subject of picketing differently than others, the First
Amendment claim became "closely intertwined" with the Equal Protection Clause claim).
Professor Tribe maintains that the crux of the compelling interest test is that "[wihenever
the harm feared could be averted by a further exchange of ideas, governmental suppres-
sion is conclusively deemed unnecessary." TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-8, at 833-34 (em-
phasis omitted); see infra notes 212-36 and accompanying text (discussing the types of
content discrimination that are not permissible unless government can meet the compelling
interest test).
185. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (listing various classes of speech, such as ob-
scenity, libel, and fighting words, that hold no constitutional protection, "and the punish-
ment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem").
186. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (prohibiting a public
official from "recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not");
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (finding that public publisher or
broadcaster who defames a private individual in the context of a public controversy may
not claim a First Amendment privilege against liability, and holding that states may define
for themselves the standard of liability to protect private individuals, as long they do not
impose strict liability); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (stating that a private figure who sues over defamation con-
cerning purely private concerns may be awarded compensatory and punitive damages
without a showing of "actual malice").
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and obscenity,' 87 will not be discussed because of their obvious inapplica-
bility to the FACE statute. The exceptions of "fighting words' 188 and
inciting unlawful conduct 189 are germane, however, because of FACE's
prohibition of threats of force.
a. "Fighting Words": Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 90 the Court characterized "fighting
words" as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."'191 In reaching the conclusion
that fighting words are unprotected by the First Amendment, the Court
reasoned that such speech has no essential role in the free marketplace of
ideas, and provides such minimal social value to society's search for truth
and information that any benefit gained from using or hearing them "is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."' 92
187. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24 (1973) (recounting that obscene material is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment, and setting forth more explanatory guidelines of what may
be considered obscene). The Court embellished the earlier definition as introduced in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), which was "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489. The new standard announced in Miller,
expanding Roth, requires a court also to determine "whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law" and
"whether the work, taken as whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 413 U.S. at 24.
188. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (memorializing the "fighting words" exception to First
Amendment protection); see infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text (setting forth the
fighting words doctrine).
189. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (announcing the test to de-
termine when speech advocates the use of force or unlawful conduct and is therefore
outside the scope of First Amendment protection); see also infra notes 199-207 and accom-
panying text (discussing the evolution of the inciting unlawful conduct doctrine).
190. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky was a Jehovah's Witness who, while distrib-
uting literature on public streets, condemned all religion as "a racket." Id. at 569-70. His
utterances apparently were upsetting a crowd that had gathered. See id. at 569. As a
result, he was approached by a police officer and asked to stop, at which point he allegedly
said "'You are a God damned racketeer' and "'a damned Fascist and the whole govern-
ment of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."' Id. He was charged under a New
Hampshire law that prohibited, inter alia, any person from addressing another person with
offensive, derisive, or annoying words. See id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court nar-
rowed the statute's construction by providing that "[t]he word 'offensive' is not to be de-
fined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks ... the test is what men of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight." Id. at 573. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction based on the fact that the
statements made by Chaplinsky were fighting words as construed by the definition pro-
vided for by New Hampshire's highest court. See id. at 572.
191. Id. at 571-72.
192. Id.; see Stone, supra note 171, at 194. The author categorizes this statement as the
emergence of "low" First Amendment value theory, meaning that the speech deserves lim-
ited constitutional protection because of its slight value to society. Id. Although the fac-
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The phrase "inflict injury" used in Chaplinsky could have been used by
government as an invitation to prohibit offensive and profane language;
however, the Court in Cohen v. California193 declined to embark on such
a slippery slope. 194 The Court updated the fighting words doctrine
slightly, omitting the subjective injury requirement and replacing it with
"those personally abusive epithets, which, when addressed to the ordi-
nary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction."'195 The fighting words doctrine has two cur-
rent forms: on an individual level, it necessarily implies a face-to-face
confrontation that would provoke the listener to act out violently, not just
trigger an angry response;' 96 the other level is directed at a group, other-
wise known as a hostile group reaction, where the government tries to
silence the speaker before the audience becomes outraged and uncontrol-
lable.' 97 The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the fighting words
doctrine throughout the years.198
tors considered by the Court in deciding whether a certain category will receive
unprotected status under the First Amendment is not clearly articulated, Professor Stone
advances that the Court focuses on "the extent to which the speech furthers the historical,
political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the first amendment." Id.
193. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited
willful or malicious breach of the peace by offensive conduct, by wearing a jacket inscribed
with the words "Fuck the Draft" in a court corridor filled with people. Id. at 16. The
Court declined to find the language obscene, and discounted the government's argument
that the state could in this instance prohibit offensive messages being "thrust upon unwill-
ing or unsuspecting viewers." Id. at 21. Finally, the Court found no recognized govern-
mental role as keeper of public morality to ban "one particular scurrilous epithet from the
public discourse." Id. at 22-23. Only certain narrow categories of speech may be prohib-
ited by government on the basis of their content, and the statute in Cohen did not fall
under any of them. See id. at 24.
194. See id. at 25. Justice Harlan artfully captured the problem of permitting govern-
mental regulation of profane or obscene language when he professed, "[olne man's vulgar-
ity is another man's lyric." Id.
195. Id. at 20.
196. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72; Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4, 6 (1949) (pronouncing that fighting words must rise "far above public incon-
venience, annoyance, or unrest," and invalidating a conviction under an overbroad regula-
tion prohibiting speech that stirred people to anger, or encouraged unrest and dispute).
197. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam). The Court overturned a
conviction of disorderly conduct during an anti-war demonstration because the speech was
not directed at any person or group, and furthermore, the speech could be taken for "coun-
sel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than the advocacy of
illegal action at some further time." Id.; cf Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316-18
(1951) (upholding conviction of a speaker who, while addressing a racially mixed crowd,
encouraged African Americans to rise up against white people).
198. See TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-10, at 850-51 (suggesting that the original fighting
words doctrine is being replaced with a doctrine that takes the context of the speech into
consideration, and not just the content); Aviva 0. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment
Distinction Between Conduct and Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding
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b. The "Inciting Unlawful Conduct" Doctrine
The basic principles behind the inciting unlawful conduct exception to
First Amendment protection can be traced to the "clear and present dan-
ger" doctrine introduced by Justice Holmes earlier this century. 199 Under
this test, a factual question must be answered as to "whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent."2 ° The clear and present danger
test was criticized as focusing only on the circumstances surrounding the
speech, and not on whether the actual content of the speech was inciting
unlawful conduct or violence.20' The argument was that permissible ad-
vocacy of a cause or idea should not be regulated unless it "counsel[s] or
advise[s] others to violate the law as it stands. '2 2
The clear and present danger test was never fully embraced because of
the restrictive impact it had upon free speech,20 3 until Brandenburg v.
Fighting Words Jurisprudence, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 793, 816-19 (1994) (arguing that the
Court's application of the fighting words doctrine has left a trail of "arbitrary and unprinci-
pled" case law).
199. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The statute at issue was the Espio-
nage Act of 1917, which prohibited obstructing the draft process, and causing or attempt-
ing to cause insubordination in any of the branches of the armed forces. See id. at 49.
Schenck and others were convicted of conspiring to violate the Act by mailing draftees
literature urging them to "assert their rights" and "not submit to intimidation." Id. at 51.
The document did not expressly advocate that the draftees engage in unlawful means to
resist the draft, however. See id. A unanimous Court upheld the conviction based upon
the newly articulated clear and present danger test, explaining that it was one of proximity
and degree. See id. at 52.
200. Id. Justice Holmes exemplified a situation where a clear and present danger would
be present by proffering the famous hypothetical of falsely yelling "fire!" in a crowded
theater. Id.
201. See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Pattern, 224 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917). In a pre-Schenck decision, Judge Learned Hand presided over a case in-
volving anti-war cartoons with captions and text that were critical of World War I and the
draft, and expressed sympathy for draft resisters. See id. at 536. The speech was not found
to advise unlawful conduct. See id. at 540-41. Concluding that the speech was abstract
advocacy, he stated: "[T]o assimilate [political] agitation, legitimate as such, with direct
incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political
agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free government." Id. at 540. Because
the speech was not a direct incitement to violate the law, he refused to allow the govern-
ment to regulate it. See id. at 542. Hand's test was not accepted by the Court until Bran-
denburg incorporated both it and the clear and present danger test into a more speech
protective standard. See TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-9, at 848 (stating that the current
statement of the law regarding fighting words is Brandenburg, which incorporated Hand's
view of protecting mere advocacy).
202. Masses Publ'g, 224 F. at 540.
203. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450-54 (1969) (per curiam). Justice Doug-
las in concurrence engaged in a historical, and not very approving, overview of the clear
and present danger doctrine. See id. at 450-54 (Douglas, J., concurring) He concluded by
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Ohio.2" In Brandenburg, the Court refined the test into a more speech-
protective doctrine referred to as "incitement of unlawful conduct."2 5
Under this doctrine, speech may be constitutionally prohibited if the reg-
ulation proscribes speech that is intended to "incit[e] or produc[e] immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action., 206
Consequently, a statute that punishes speech because of its advocacy of
ideas, without the requirements of imminency or probability of unlawful
action, will be struck down as a violation of the First Amendment.20 7
c. "True Threats"
Although not specifically referred to as a categorical exception to the
First Amendment's protection of speech, threats of force are not consid-
ered protected speech by the Supreme Court.20 8 The reasons given by
the Supreme Court are that government has an important interest in pro-
tecting citizens from the fear of violence, the disruption that such fear
causes, and the possibility that the speaker will actually commit the
threatened violence.20 9 The Supreme Court has never defined what con-
stitutes a threat other than it must be a "true threat," and not political
hyperbole; 210 thus, this question still remains open.
clearly relating that "I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any 'clear
and present danger' test." Id. at 454.
204. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
205. The facts of Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan leader who was convicted
under a state criminal syndicalism statute, which prohibited the advocacy of crime or vio-
lence as a method of achieving industrial or political reform. See id. at 445. During a
television filming of a KKK meeting, the leader made several statements, including one
statement directing that "revengeance" be taken if the government continued to suppress
the white race. Id. at 446. The Court, against the backdrop of the newly articulated incite-
ment of unlawful conduct standard, examined the state statute and found that it was not
drafted in a manner consistent with the First Amendment. See id. at 448. The Court there-
fore did not reach the issue of whether the speaker's expression could be prohibited as
inciting unlawful conduct. See id. at 448-49.
206. Id at 447.
207. See id. at 449.
208. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994) (finding that
threats made to patients and their family members, "however communicated, are proscrib-
able under the First Amendment); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)
(concluding that threats of violence are not protected by the First Amendment); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (upholding statute that prohibited threats
against the President because regulation distinguished "a threat ... from what is constitu-
tionally protected speech").
209. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
210. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
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2. The Compelling Governmental Interest Exception
The First Amendment protects "speech," but it is essentially political
speech that is at the heart of the Amendment.211 Public debate in a pub-
lic forum is what the Constitution promises; the logical corollary to this
precept is that government should not discriminate in favor of "a single
class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject., 2 12 There is an
"equality of status in the field of ideas" and government should permit all
topics, points of view, and messengers an opportunity to be heard.21 3
a. Discriminating Against Speech Through Regulation of Subject
Matter, Speaker, or Viewpoint
This ideal of free speech correspondingly translates into the principle
that regulations of speech should be content-neutral, with the exception
of the narrowly defined categories of unprotected speech previously dis-
cussed.214 Subject matter discrimination is present where a regulation de-
scribes permissible speech in terms of a broad topic, for instance,
permitting peaceful labor picketing, but excluding all other picketing.215
The second category of content discrimination is directed at the speaker,
and can be found where a regulation allows certain groups or individuals
access to a forum to express their viewpoint, but restricts or prohibits
others from the same avenue of communication. 1 6 It can be concep-
211. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (recognizing that the First Amendment
"reflects a 'profound national commitment"' to an open and public exchange on issues of
public concern); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (noting that any
restriction based on the content of speech cuts across the national commitment to a robust
public discussion on issues of public concern); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)(advocating that the fact that the "air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony" is a
sign of society's strength, not weakness).
212. Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
213. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (1972) (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTrrUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLe 27 (1948)); see Paul B. Stephan III, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 208-10 (1982) (discussing the
high regard for political speech in Supreme Court jurisprudence and various commenta-
tors' theories on the reasons for the Court's respect in this area).
214. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that content-based
restrictions are presumptively invalid, with the exception of traditional limitations of
speech in areas such as obscenity, fighting words, and defamation); see also supra notes
185-210 and accompanying text (reviewing certain unprotected categories of speech that
may be regulated based on content).
215. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. Content discrimination based on the subject matter of
speech is "impermissible because the First Amendment's hostility to content-based regula-
tion extends ... to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Boos, 485 U.S. at
319 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).
216. See Perry Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. at 54 (scrutinizing collective bargaining agreement
between school district and teachers' exclusive bargaining representative that only permit-
ted use of interschool mail system to incumbent union and not to rival). The Court upheld
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tually difficult to ascertain the distinction between speaker discrimination
and viewpoint discrimination, because in reality, each speaker has a par-
ticular view on any subject that he or she would want to convey if given
the opportunity.217
Nevertheless, viewpoint discrimination is a separate category of con-
tent discrimination, propounded as "censorship in the purest form...
threaten[ing] the continued vitality of 'free speech."'218 Viewpoint dis-
crimination occurs where government permits discussion regarding a sub-
ject matter, yet prohibits the expression of certain points of view
pertaining to that subject matter.219 This may well be the most insidious
of all content-based regulations, not only because it disadvantages those
whose viewpoint is stifled, but those receiving alternative viewpoints may
never realize that there is a competing point of view in society.220
the restriction on the use of the mail system in Perry Education Association based on the
fact that the school's mail system was not a public forum, or even a limited one, and be-
cause of this fact "not all speech is equally situated, and the State may draw distinctions
which relate to the special purpose for which the property is used." Id. at 55. The differ-
ence in status between an exclusive bargaining representative and a rival union is a distinc-
tion which may be permissibly drawn when regulating the use of the school's mail system.
See id. The Court appears to uphold many speaker-based restrictions in labor relations
situations. See TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-3, at 796 n.14 (providing examples of the
Supreme Court upholding speaker distinctions in labor regulation cases).
217. See Perry Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing with ap-
proval the court of appeals' finding that the school district, through the regulation of exclu-
sive access to the mailboxes, formed "a speaker restriction, favor[ing] a particular
viewpoint on labor relations"); Stone, supra note 171, at 249 (noting that there is often a
close connection between speaker and viewpoint discrimination regulations).
218. Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
219. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (finding that a "bedrock principle"
of the Constitution is that "government may not prohibit expression simply because it dis-
agrees with its message"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980) (striking down ordi-
nance because it accorded preferential treatment to one viewpoint, and restricted all
others); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (pronouncing that under
both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, government may not selec-
tively prohibit certain viewpoints from public debate, yet allow others to be heard).
220. See Stone, supra note 171, at 198 (explaining that viewpoint discrimination "muti-
lates 'the thinking process of the community' and is thus incompatible with the central
precepts of the first amendment"). Professor Stone stresses that because of this serious
inconsistency with the First Amendment's ideals, only the most compelling interests ad-
vanced by government will permit a court to uphold a viewpoint-based statute. See id. But
see Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 113, 130-31 (1981) (disagreeing with the premise that content-based restrictions
"leave the public with a more incomplete and inaccurate perception of social reality" as
neither intuitive nor supportable).
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b. Regulation That Is Discriminatory Against Speech May Still
Survive if Compelling Interest Test Met
In determining whether a regulation is content-neutral, the govern-
ment's purpose is the controlling factor.221 If the government regulates
expressive conduct without reference to the content of the speech that
motivates the conduct, and the regulation is facially neutral, then the gov-
ernment has regulated in a content-neutral manner.222 Correspondingly,
the listener's reaction to speech usually is not a primary factor in finding a
statute content-neutral. 223 When a statute is found to be content-based
by regulating beyond the unprotected categories of speech and discrimi-
nating based on subject matter, speaker, or viewpoint, it will be subjected
to an Equal Protection Clause analysis. 224
All three content discrimination categories-subject matter, speaker,
and viewpoint-are presumptively invalid unless the regulation with-
stands an Equal Protection examination.225 The government must show
that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. '226 If government sustains
this stringent burden, the regulation will be upheld even though it is
content-based; if government cannot, the regulation will be held
unconstitutional. 227
221. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that a regula-
tion that is unrelated to the content of speech will be found to be neutral, "even if it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others"). Of course, irrespective of
governmental purpose, a statute may be found to be facially discriminatory against certain
subjects, speakers, or viewpoints. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (finding that ordinance de-
scribed permissible picketing in terms of subject matter); see also supra notes 212-20 and
accompanying text (discussing subject matter, speaker and viewpoint discrimination).
222. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
223. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992); Johnson,
491 U.S. at 408 (declining to find that listener's offense or hostile reaction to speech is a
basis for content regulation).
224. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 54 (1983)
(stating that content discrimination based upon the provider of information, although in
the First Amendment arena, will be examined under the Equal Protection Clause); Carey,
447 U.S. at 461-62 (subjecting viewpoint discrimination regulation to an Equal Protection
Clause analysis); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101 (finding that a content-based regulation pertain-
ing to subject matter must be analyzed according to the Equal Protection Clause).
225. See supra note 224 (providing a case that illustrates the precept that a content-
based regulation that is discriminatory will be exposed to an equal protection examina-
tion). The Supreme Court acknowledges that it has "occasionally fused the First Amend-
ment into the Equal Protection Clause" but that no question exists that the First
Amendment issue is present and that it initiated the equal protection inquiry. R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 n.4 (1992).
226. Perry Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. at 45.
227. See id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-3, at 798 (recognizing that the
Supreme Court applies the "most exacting scrutiny" to regulations that discriminate based
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c. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: A Lesson in Viewpoint Regulation
An important caveat to content-based regulation jurisprudence, partic-
ularly viewpoint discrimination, was added by the Court in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul.228 At issue was an ordinance that prohibited the placement of
a symbol, object, or graffiti that "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender;" the highest
state court found the ordinance to be a regulation of fighting words.229
The Supreme Court found the regulation unconstitutional, holding that
viewpoint discrimination within a category of unprotected speech is not
permissible unless government can meet the compelling governmental in-
terest test, which the Court implied to mean that no content-neutral alter-
native exists.23° R.A.V. stands for the proposition that although the
government may identify limited categories of speech as unprotected, it
generally may not selectively regulate subsets of these categories due to a
hostility toward the viewpoint contained.231 This is an important princi-
ple, for prior to R.A. V. it was assumed that an area of speech within one
of the unprotected categories of First Amendment section was completely
devoid of First Amendment concerns.232
on speech content (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)); cf Police Dept.
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972) (insisting that a regulation based on the
subject matter of speech must be narrowly tailored to a substantial governmental interest).
228. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
229. Id. at 380.
230. See id. at 395-96. The ordinance in R.A.V. prohibited specific categories of fight-
ing words or "hate speech" that communicated messages of racial, gender, or religious
intolerance, creating a presumption that the city was attempting to limit particular view-
points. See id. at 394. The Court, upon identifying content discrimination through view-
point regulation, analyzed the regulation under the Equal Protection Clause, stating that
the "dispositive question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is rea-
sonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests; it plainly is not." Id. at 395-96.
The Court found that the state's interest in protecting members of society that histori-
cally have been subjected to discrimination was compelling, and that the ordinance pro-
moted this interest; however, the Court found that it was not narrowly tailored because a
content-neutral regulation against fighting words would better further the interest in a non-
discriminatory way. See id. at 395; cf Wertheimer, supra note 198, at 824 (maintaining that
the Court did not apply the compelling interest test, instead looking only to a content-
neutral alternative).
231. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393-94. The Court firmly dispelled the idea that First
Amendment establishes the tenet that the government may freely regulate categories of
proscribable speech. See id. at 384. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, maintained a
slight distinction, perhaps never before stated, that the Court has never contended that
unprotected categories have "'no part of the expression of ideas,' but only that they consti-
tute 'no essential part of any exposition of ideas."' Id. at 385 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
232. See id. at 384.
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Qualifying this sweeping holding, however, the Court stated that sub-
ject matter discrimination within an unprotected category may be lawful
provided that the restriction is not even arguably "conditioned upon the
sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may intend to say.",233 Thus,
R.A.V. provides that when the purpose for the subject matter discrimina-
tion is based on the reason the entire category of speech is unpro-
tected,234 or when a regulation directed at conduct contains subject
matter discrimination associated with the "secondary effects" of the
speech, the regulation may stand.235 Despite these qualifications, the
R.A.V. Court clearly pronounced that unprotected categories of speech
are not "entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made
the vehicles for [viewpoint] discrimination unrelated to their distinctively
",236proscribable content.
C. Confusion in the Courts
FACE regulates three types of activity: verbal speech, such as threats of
force; non-violent conduct, such as physical obstruction; and violent con-
duct, such as the use of force.2 37 When courts are confronted with a First
Amendment challenge to FACE, the initial step should be to differentiate
among verbal speech, non-verbal expressive conduct, and non-verbal,
233. Id. at 390 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981)).
R. A. V. addressed regulation of a category of unprotected speech that was also discrimina-
tory against viewpoint. See id. at 392-93; cf. Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive
Speech, and Public Discourse in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1145-46 (1994)
(advancing the theory that the Court "reconceptualized" the compelling interest test when
examining all viewpoint discrimination regulations).
234. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388. The Court qualified the holding by permitting content
discrimination in an unprotected category where the "basis for the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable" be-
cause then the dangers of suppression of political speech and ideas do not exist. Id. An
example given which illustrated this point was that government could ban only the most
extreme forms of obscenity, but it could not only prohibit obscenity with offensive political
messages. See id.
235. Id. at 389. The Court expressed this concept in a hypothetical statute that permit-
ted all obscene live performances, except those involving minors. See id. Furthermore,
words can sometimes violate laws "directed not against speech but against conduct (a law
against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense
secrets"). Id. Thus, certain categories of unprotected speech can be incidentally affected
by a statute that is directed at conduct. See id. The Court placed Title VII within this
exception, maintaining that when a regulation does not target conduct because of its ex-
pressive content, "acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy." Id. at 390-91.
236. Id. at 384.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1994); see supra notes 2, 71, 73, and accompanying text (pro-
viding the types of activities that FACE regulates).
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non-expressive conduct.23 s For example: if the facts of a case involve
only non-verbal conduct, then the threshold inquiry should be to deter-
mine if it is expressive or non-expressive using the Spence test.
239 If
found to be expressive conduct, the statute should be evaluated using the
four steps provided for in O'Brien to ascertain whether the incidental
restrictions on the speech-related conduct is permissible under the First
Amendment.24 ° If the conduct does not pass the Spence test, and there-
fore is not expressive conduct, it simply is not protected by the First
Amendment.24'
1. Blurring the Distinction Between Conduct and Speech Analysis
The main structural problem with the manner in which FACE often is
examined under the First Amendment is that some courts do not distin-
guish among the distinct activities regulated by FACE.242 Consequently,
and most importantly, the different attributes and method of examination
that corresponds to each are jumbled.243 For instance, a court may have a
physical obstruction violation pending, which may be non-expressive, un-
protected conduct, or may be expressive conduct depending on the sur-
238. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (examining a conviction for breach
of the peace for wearing a jacket with profanity on it, the Court found that what was being
punished was not the conduct, but the communicative element behind the conduct).
239. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (exploring whether "an intent
to convey a particularized message was present," and whether under all the surrounding
circumstances the message would be understood by those who viewed it).
240. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
241. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10.
242. See United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995). Without any
introduction as to what type of activity the court was examining under the First Amend-
ment, the district court begins its analysis with whether FACE is a viewpoint-based regula-
tion. See id. Upon inspection of the facts of the case, the charge against the defendants
was physical obstruction of a clinic by welding themselves into vehicles. See id. at 1422. In
a similar misapplication, the Cook court found that plaintiffs engaged in peaceful activity,
such as sidewalk counseling and distributing literature, but that they also were charged
with physical obstruction under FACE. See Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (W.D.
La. 1994). Immediately after these observations, however, the court began the First
Amendment examination with a viewpoint discrimination analysis, instead of the proper
starting point for conduct regulations, which is Spence and O'Brien. See id.
243. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648-51 (4th Cir.) (finding
initially that FACE incidentally regulates expressive conduct, the court delved into a dis-
cussion of viewpoint discrimination and concluded with O'Brien), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55
(1995); Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424 (examining a physical obstruction violation, the court
commenced with viewpoint discrimination analysis and ended with the O'Brien test);
Cook, 859 F. Supp. at 1010 (intimating that peaceful conduct may be implicated by FACE,
the court started with the claim that FACE is viewpoint-based and closed with an O'Brien
examination).
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rounding circumstances. 244 Thus, the court should begin with the two-
part Spence test to determine if the activity is expressive or non-expres-
sive conduct, and if it is expressive, advance to an O'Brien inquiry.2 45
Instead, some courts, having determined that the conduct regulated by
FACE may be expressive, move immediately to a First Amendment anal-
ysis entailing a viewpoint discrimination examination,246 which is a form
of content-based regulation of pure speech.247 Another related problem
is when a court engages in a viewpoint discrimination evaluation, but only
has before it a physical obstruction violation with no logical link to ex-
pressive conduct.248 Physical obstruction is itself unprotected conduct.249
Unless the court makes the connection that some expressive conduct,
such as peaceful picketing, may be encompassed by the physical obstruc-
tion component of FACE, or is presented with evidence that Congress
was motivated by an animus against pro-life speech, there is no First
Amendment issue. In either situation, the starting point for First Amend-
ment analysis is inexact.25°
244. See Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424 (examining statute under a physical obstruction
violation); Cook, 859 F. Supp. at 1010 (same). Physical obstruction of the ingress or egress
of a building is conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (finding a statute constitutional that only prohibited picketing that
physically obstructed entrances and exits from courthouse buildings); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (stating that physical obstruction is unprotected conduct regardless of
the intent of expression which motivates it).
245. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (determining whether burning a draft card was ex-
pressive conduct, and after finding that it was, engaging in four-part test designed to ex-
amine whether the incidental restrictions on conduct could be constitutionally justified);
see also supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text (explaining sequence of First Amend-
ment analysis when confronted with potentially expressive conduct).
246. See supra note 243 (illustrating two cases that have engaged in this practice).
247. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (explaining that even
though the challenged ordinance was a permissible content-based regulation of fighting
words-an unprotected category of speech-it also was an impermissible content-based
regulation of viewpoint); see also supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text (describing
the characteristics of viewpoint discrimination).
248. See United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995). The case
before the court was a physical obstruction violation, but making no mention of the charge
or types of conduct that FACE may regulate, the court commenced First Amendment anal-
ysis with an inquiry into viewpoint discrimination.
249. See Cameron, 390 U.S. at 617 (explaining that physical obstruction does not impli-
cate the First Amendment because the activity bears no "necessary relationship" to the
dissemination of ideas or information).
250. See supra note 242-43 (describing cases that improperly mix and borrow between
distinctly different analyses of expressive conduct and pure speech); cf. United States v.
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922-23 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No.
96-5615). The Eighth Circuit in Dinwiddie began its First Amendment examination by
focusing on the defendant's contention that FACE's threats of force provision was a con-
tent-based restriction. See id. at 922. The court appropriately entered into a pure speech
analysis of content-based regulations, and after finding that FACE regulated an unpro-
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Admittedly, courts that find the conduct expressive could be commenc-
ing their analysis with the third step of O'Brien: whether government's
purpose in regulating conduct is unrelated to the suppression of
speech.2"1 This element of O'Brien asks whether the government's inter-
est in the regulation is unrelated to the communicative impact of the non-
verbal expressive conduct on the viewer, which often is essentially the
same analysis as a verbal speech analysis,2"2 of which viewpoint discrimi-
nation is a subcategory.253 The emergence of a full O'Brien analysis in
court opinions only after the viewpoint examination has concluded, how-
ever, dispels this theory, and thereby displays a haphazard approach to
First Amendment methodology.254
2. Misapplying First Amendment Terminology
Another potential area of improvement is court usage of accurate and
appropriate First Amendment terminology. In the area of content-based
distinctions, in particular subject matter and viewpoint discrimination, it
is understandably difficult because the Supreme Court itself has not been
clear and consistent.255
tected category of speech, and that the motive requirement did not render the statute a
viewpoint discrimination regulation, concluded that FACE was content-neutral. See id. at
922-23. The court recognized, however, that some of FACE's prohibited conduct may inci-
dentally affect protected conduct, such as peaceful picketing that could physically obstruct
one's entrance into a clinic, and therefore engaged in an O'Brien analysis. See id. at 923-
24. The court concluded that FACE passed all four steps and was therefore constitutional,
even though it may incidentally affect some protected expressive conduct. See id.; see also
Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 700-01 (D. Ariz. 1994) (beginning with expressive conduct
and an O'Brien analysis, then proceeding to a pure speech examination).
251. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the third step of O'Brien).
252. Compare supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (exploring the inquiry behind
O'Brien's step three, which requires courts to determine whether the government's pur-
pose behind the regulation of conduct is related to the suppression of speech), with supra
notes 211-36 and accompanying text (discussing content-based regulation).
253. See supra notes 211-36 and accompanying text (examining content-based regula-
tions that are discriminatory in purpose).
254. Considering a fact-based scenario that involves physical obstruction, some courts
begin with a discussion about whether the statute is content-based, specifically viewpoint,
and then conclude with the O'Brien test. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d
642, 651-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); United States v. Lucero, 895 F.
Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (W.D. La. 1994).
255. See TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-3, at 800 n.23 (finding that the Court's treatment
of subject matter discrimination within the rubric of content-based regulation has not been
consistent). Professor Tribe finds that the Court's treatment of the content discrimination
categories "arbitrary and easily manipulable." Id. at 803; see Redish, supra note 220, at
117-18 (finding that the Court's application of subject matter discrimination is ambiguous,
and that the Court tends to reserve its strictest scrutiny for viewpoint discrimination);
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It is confusing as to what a court actually analyzes when it examines
whether FACE is content-based. First, courts recurringly phrase the First
Amendment issue as whether FACE is either content or viewpoint-based,
as if there were separate inquiries, but then only seem to discuss whether
FACE is viewpoint-based.256 Second, it is difficult to determine what a
court is examining when it explores both whether FACE is a content-
based or a viewpoint-based statute, for viewpoint discrimination is a type
of content-based regulation, and not independent from it.2 It is possible
that courts either are engaging solely in a viewpoint discrimination exam-
ination, or are confusing content-based with subject matter
discrimination.2 58
The question of whether FACE discriminates against the pro-life
message should thus begin with the possible types of content discrimina-
tion that have been identified by the Court: subject matter, speaker, and
viewpoint.259 With a statute as important as FACE to the public debate
of abortion, it should be a paramount responsibility to engage in thor-
ough, precise, and clear analyses so that pro-life citizens have an opportu-
nity for their claims to be fairly heard. While no court has ever fully
examined all three types of activity that FACE regulates under the First
Amendment, this Comment concludes with such an analysis.
Stone, supra note 171, at 239-42 (discussing the problematic subject matter discrimination
and its questionable fit into the content-based regulation regime).
256. See Cook, 859 F. Supp. at 1010 (engaging in inquiry as to whether FACE is view-
point neutral, and upon summation that it is, examining whether FACE is a discriminatory
content-based restriction).
257. See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text (explaining that the main category
is content-based discrimination, and that viewpoint is one of three identifiable subsets).
258. See TRIBE, supra at 159, § 12-3, at 803. Conceding the difficulty in distinguishing
between the types of speech restrictions, Professor Tribe argues that content-based restric-
tions on speech "may regulate speech on the basis of its general subject matter ('no discus-
sion of the upcoming election') or on the basis of its particular viewpoint ('no criticism of
the Democratic candidate')." Id. He also mentions the category of speaker-based restric-
tions, but notes that it is difficult to separate this category from that of viewpoint. See id.
259. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) (examining an ordinance that pro-
hibited certain speech surrounding foreign embassies, the court first inquired as to whether
the content-based regulation was discriminatorily based on viewpoint; deciding that it was
not, the Court advanced to whether it was based on subject matter, which was answered in
the affirmative); see also supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text (describing the three
types of content-based regulations that discriminate on the basis of speech).
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V. A COMPLETE FIRST AMENDMENT EXAMINATION OF EACH
CATEGORY OF ACTIVITY REGULATED BY FACE: NON-
EXPRESSIVE AND EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT, AND
VERBAL SPEECH
A. FACE Regulates Non-Verbal Conduct by Proscribing Acts of Force
and Physical Obstruction
As a threshold matter, it is necessary to determine whether First
Amendment analysis is necessary for FACE's regulation of non-verbal
conduct. FACE prohibits violent conduct, such as acts of force. 26° It also
proscribes physical obstruction with the intent to injure, intimidate, or
interfere with another person because that person is obtaining or provid-
ing reproductive health services. 261 The first inquiry is to ascertain
whether such conduct is expressive conduct falling within the scope of
First Amendment methodology.262 The Spence two-part analysis is the
proper analytical vehicle for this determination: whether there is an in-
tent to convey a particular message and whether under the surrounding
circumstances the message would be understood by the viewer.263 If the
conduct fails the Spence test, it is non-expressive conduct outside the pur-
view of the First Amendment.264
The use of force has never been found by the Supreme Court to meet
the Spence test of expressive conduct. 265 For instance, if someone shot
and killed another person over a political disagreement, there arguably
may be an intent by the shooter to convey a message, but seldom would
anyone witnessing the shooting understand that a particularized message
was being conveyed by the act. Accordingly, the violent conduct pro-
scribed by FACE is not expressive, and is plainly beyond the First
Amendment's breadth of coverage.266
260. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) & (3) (1994) (prohibiting force with intent to injure, intimi-
date, or interfere with a person because that person is either obtaining or providing repro-
ductive health services, and further proscribing intentional damage or destruction of
property that provides reproductive health services).
261. Id § 248(a)(1) (encompassing attempts to injure, intimidate, or interfere with an-
other person as well).
262. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text (providing proper First Amend-
ment inquiry when reviewing statute that regulates conduct).
263. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974).
264. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (illustrating the use and purpose of
the Spence test).
265. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (stating that "a physical assault
is not by any stretch of the imagination" expressive conduct that receives First Amendment
protection).
266. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922 (8th Cir.) (recognizing that the
use of force does not enjoy First Amendment protection), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug.
6, 1996) (No. 96-5615); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 648 (4th Cir.)
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The Court has also found that physical obstruction does not receive
First Amendment protection, 67 stating that "[a] group of demonstrators
[can] not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to a
public or private building, and allow no one to pass who [does] not agree
to listen to their extortions. ''2 68 FACE prohibits physical obstruction with
the intent to injure, intimidate, or interfere with another person because
that person is either obtaining or providing reproductive health serv-
ices.2 69 Furthermore, physical obstruction is defined by FACE as render-
ing passage to or from a facility "unreasonably difficult or hazardous. ' 270
To violate FACE's regulation of physical obstruction, the actor must have
the intent to injure, intimidate, or interfere with another person;2 7 1 this
requirement prohibits an inadvertent violation of the statute. If there is
no such intent, there is no FACE violation.
If physical obstruction is present with the intent to injure, interfere
with another person's movement, or intimidate, defined by FACE as plac-
ing another person in reasonable apprehension of personal bodily harm
or harm to another, because another is either obtaining or providing re-
productive health services, a violation of FACE has occurred. 72 Even
though physical obstruction is generally unprotected by the First Amend-
ment, in FACE's context a Spence inquiry is appropriate to address
claims that FACE incidentally regulates some peaceful conduct. It could
well be the case that sometimes physical obstruction with the required
intent may be inextricably combined with peaceful conduct and expres-
sion, such as picketing with placards bearing messages, handing out leaf-
lets, and verbal speech. 73 This type of physical obstruction violation
(finding that the use of force or violence is not protected by the First Amendment), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1426
(S.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting that the violent conduct regulated by FACE receives any First
Amendment scrutiny).
267. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (finding that physical obstruc-
tion has no necessary link to the freedom to disseminate information or express an opin-
ion); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (maintaining that blocking access to
public streets, or public or private entrances, is not a form of speech protected by the First
Amendment).
268. Cox, 379 U.S. at 555.
269. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994).
270. Id. § 248(e)(4).
271. See id. § 248(a)(1).
272. See id. § 248(a)(1).
273. This type of conduct long has been recognized by the Court as expressive. See
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (citing an exhaustive compilation
of cases for the proposition that peaceful picketing involves expressive conduct); TRIBE,
supra note 159, § 12-7, at 829. Professor Tribe provides a comprehensive list of activities
that have historically been recognized as speech-related conduct, for example: "outdoor
distribution of leaflets or pamphlets; door-to-door political canvassing; solicitation of con-
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would most likely meet a Spence test: it is probable that such activity in
the close vicinity of a clinic would convey an intent by the protestors to
express the message that abortion is wrong, and that those who view such
a demonstration would understand that message.274 Therefore, because
in certain factual situations the non-verbal act of physical obstruction
with the requisite intent may be expressive, FACE's regulation of such
conduct should be evaluated under the four-part O'Brien test.275
1. Finding the Non-Verbal Act of Physical Obstruction to be
Expressive Conduct. A Requisite O'Brien Examination
In situations where non-verbal conduct has been found to be expres-
sive, an O'Brien analysis is appropriate.276 O'Brien requires that the reg-
ulation be enacted pursuant to valid congressional power, that it further a
substantial governmental interest, that the government's purpose be un-
related to the suppression of free speech, and that the incidental restric-
tions on free speech be no more burdensome than necessary.277
The most efficacious starting point in an O'Brien analysis is step three:
whether the government's purpose in promulgating a regulation is unre-
lated to the suppression of free speech.278 When addressing this issue, an
tributions ... ; mailbox stuffing; picketing; civil rights demonstrations and boycotts; com-
municating with government; [and] putting up outdoor posters or signs." Id. at 829-30
(citations omitted).
274. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1375 (7th Cir.) (explaining that
although physical obstruction has expressive elements, the First Amendment does not ex-
tend its protection to "coercive or obstructionist conduct solely because it serves some
passionate ideology or interest" (quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 395
(2d Cir. 1995)), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996)), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W.
3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,
648 (4th Cir.) (finding that FACE "might incidentally affect some conduct with protected
expressive elements, such as peaceful but obstructive picketing"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55
(1995); Jill W. Rose & Chris Osborn, Note, FACE-ial Neutrality: A Free Speech Challenge
to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 81 VA. L. REv. 1505, 1523 (1995) (finding
that FACE regulates conduct that is inextricably related to expression).
275. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Brien test and its
application).
276. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 923-24 (8th Cir.) (engaging in O'Brien
examination), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615); American Life
League, 47 F.3d at 651-52 (same); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D.
Kan. 1995) (same); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1436-37 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(same); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693,700 (D. Ariz. 1994) (same). But see Cook v. Reno,
859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010-11 (W.D. La. 1994) (finding that FACE may affect expressive con-
duct, but not engaging in O'Brien analysis because once a statute regulates unprotected
conduct, "it in no way implicates the right of speech and assembly").
277. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
278. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (conceding that the Court has lim-
ited the applicability of O'Brien's "relatively lenient standard to those cases in which 'the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression"' (quoting
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examination of the congressional purpose behind the enactment of FACE
is important.279 This entails a close examination of the language and leg-
islative history of the statute. 80 The Court has viewed potential content
discrimination by the government as an indication that it may be acting
out of malice toward a particular group, and consequently scrutinizes the
regulation closely.281 Every reason for the regulation that is given by the
government in support of the regulation will be carefully inspected to
determine if it is legitimate, or is a cleverly veiled attempt to disguise
discrimination based on speech content.28 2
The Court has respected government's discretion in regulating to pro-
tect public policy within the boundaries of the First Amendment. 83 The
statute's stated purpose and rules of construction indicate that Congress
enacted FACE to protect interstate commerce and the public's health and
safety.2 4 The legislative history also is replete with the theme that FACE
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); see also supra note 174 (citing Supreme Court precedent that
indicates that the third prong of O'Brien is the appropriate point to begin analysis of a
regulation that affects expressive conduct).
279. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (illustrating the importance of in-
specting congressional purpose).
280. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 649 (4th Cir.) cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
281. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). The
zoning ordinance in Cleburne was underinclusive and suggested discrimination against the
mentally challenged. See id. Only facilities for the mentally challenged were required to
obtain a special permit for group house zoning, but not other multiple-dwelling facilities,
such as nursing homes, or sanitariums. See id. at 447-48; Stone, supra note 171, at 206
(noting that although the Court has relied heavily on the Equal Protection Clause when
reviewing allegations of discrimination against speech, it is still important to remember
that the First Amendment is what is at issue); see also supra notes 219, 224-25 and accom-
panying text (illustrating that the Court uses the Equal Protection Clause analysis during
an examination of whether a statute is an impermissible regulation based on content
discrimination).
282. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50. Each proffer by the government for the restric-
tion on group homes for the mentally challenged was rejected as not legitimate and
thereby impermissibly underinclusive. See id. For example, the city was concerned with
the "negative attitudes" of surrounding property owners. See id. at 448. The Court dis-
missed this interest because society's fear or misguidance about the mentally challenged is
not a legitimate basis for treating a group home for the mentally challenged differently
than other group homes. See id. Next, the city was fearful of the reaction from the junior
high school students across the street; again, validating this interest would be sanctioning
discrimination. See id. at 449. Arguments were offered expressing concern that the pro-
posed home's location was on a "five hundred year flood plain," but the Court noted this
concern should be present for any group home that wanted that location. Id. The argu-
ments were all struck down as masking discrimination against the mentally challenged, and
the ordinance was invalidated. See id. at 450.
283. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 294 (1957)
(upholding restriction prohibiting picketing meant to coerce employer to pressure employ-
ees to join union because the activity was in direct contradiction with state labor law).
284. See supra note 68 (providing stated congressional purposes of FACE).
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does not prohibit conduct because of its message, but because of its dele-
terious effects. 285 Moreover, the motive requirement narrows FACE's
scope by limiting its reach to the type of conduct that Congress has deter-
mined affects public health and safety, women's access to reproductive
health services, and interstate commerce.286 The reasons given by Con-
gress for enacting FACE and imposing a motive requirement withstand
more than a cursory, deferential examination, and therefore are legiti-
mate: protecting a segment of the public from a national pattern of specif-
ically directed violence and obstructive conduct motivated by the protest
of the legality of a constitutional right, and the resulting impact this con-
duct has on public health and safety, and interstate commerce.287
Furthermore, FACE enjoyed bi-partisan support during its journey
through Congress; 288 even avid opponents of abortion spoke on behalf of
the bill.2 89 The endorsement of FACE by some pro-life Members demon-
strates that it is very possible for someone to oppose abortion, yet abhor
the violent and obstructive tactics used by some in protesting it, by advo-
cating a legislative response to stop the violence and blockades surround-
285. See United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 860-61 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (finding that
the legislative history documents the harmful effects of clinic blockades and harassment
and the inadequacy of the states' efforts to address these effects), affd sub nom. United
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S.
July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); see also supra notes 2-11 (providing examples of violent and
obstructive conduct that prompted Congress to enact FACE; supra note 68 and accompa-
nying text (describing congressional purposes for enacting FACE).
286. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (finding a Wisconsin pen-
alty-enhancement statute constitutional that prohibited discriminatory motives for acting
because this type of conduct was thought "to inflict greater individual and social harm");
American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d at 642, 650 (4th Cir.) (explaining that Con-
gress has discretion to "single out" certain conduct it finds harmful to individuals and soci-
ety by narrowing the scope of the statute with a motive requirement), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 55 (1995); Hearing, supra note 28, at 91 (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe) ("It is widely
regarded as a mark of our civilization that we make the intention of the actor relevant to
the question of whether the person is deemed a wrongdoer.").
287. See supra notes 2-11, 25-66 and accompanying text (identifying the various reasons
for enacting FACE).
288. In the "Additional Views" section of the Senate Report on FACE, former Senator
Durenberger, while personally expressing his belief that abortion is wrong, nonetheless
voiced his support for the bill. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 39. Succinctly put,
the Senator stated, "[I]t is incumbent upon those of us who oppose the taking of innocent
human [life] also to oppose and deplore actions which harm others." Id.
289. See 139 CONG. REc. H10,081 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Sangmeister). Supporting FACE as it moved through House debate, Rep. Sangmeister
affirmed that although he is "pro-life both personally and politically," he urged his col-
leagues to vote for FACE because violence, harassment, and vandalism should not be tol-
erated. Id. Former Senator Danforth was a recognized defender of the pro-life movement
in Congress, but, nevertheless, supported the enactment of FACE and spoke on the bill's
behalf. 139 CONG. REc. S15,680 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
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ing the provision of reproductive health services. 2" In fact, due to the
comments and concerns of the pro-life movement, Congress amended the
original bill.2 9 ' The original version addressed only violence and obstruc-
tive conduct aimed at abortion clinics and services;2" the final version
extends protection to "services relating to pregnancy or the termination
of a pregnancy." '293
It goes without saying, however, that one will rarely find a "smoking
gun" in the legislative purpose or history of the statute that points to
government's unsavory motivation in enacting a regulation.294 An exami-
nation of the statute's content-neutrality will greatly assist in determining
whether government has regulated conduct because of a hostility toward
the content of speech that inspires the conduct. 295 Consequently, analysis
290. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374; see also supra notes 2, 25 (recognizing that many
participants in the pro-life movement condone violence as a way of protesting the contin-
ued legality of abortion).
291. See S. 636, 103d Cong. (1993). For instance, the only terms defined in the original
bill were "abortion services," "Attorney General," "medical facility," and "state." See id.
Moreover, the penalties were much stiffer, in that there was no leniency for offenders of
physical obstruction violations. Id. at §3(b). A first time offender could receive fines, up
to a year in prison, or both; a repeat offender would be subject to fines, up to three years in
prison, or both. See id.; cf. supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (providing FACE's
criminal penalties for physical obstruction which are less than those the original bill
granted).
292. See S. 636, 103d Cong. (1993). The original bill only covered abortion services,
which was defined as including "medical, surgical, counselling or referral services relating
to the termination of a pregnancy." Id. The phrase "medical facilities" was to include
facilities that provided health, surgical services, counseling or referrals related to such serv-
ices. See id.; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 24-25 (advocating that the term
"medical facilities" could cover facilities that did not offer abortions, although the act spe-
cifically only discussed and defined "abortion services").
293. 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(5) (1994) (providing that "reproductive health services" encom-
passes those "services relating to the human reproductive system, including services related
to pregnancy or the termination of a pregnancy"); see United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d
1370, 1376 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-
141). The Seventh Circuit found that by broadening the scope of FACE out of caution,
Congress "finessed" the assertion that the statute is content-based. See id. Although those
being prosecuted under the statute are primarily pro-life, they are violating the provision
of interfering with pregnancy or abortion related services. See id.
294. See TRIBE, supra note 159, § 12-6, at 823 (admitting the difficulty in "ferreting out
the real purpose of a collective lawmaking body"); Stone, supra note 171, at 230-31 (recog-
nizing the difficulty in discovering the true motivation behind a regulation that affects
speech); cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). The O'Brien Court ex-
plained that inquiries into alleged illicit government motivation are generally a "hazardous
matter." Id. But when an otherwise constitutional law is alleged to have been enacted due
to improper purpose based on statements made by a few lawmakers, the Court will decline
to strike it down because "the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork." Id.
at 384.
295. See Stone, supra note 171, at 230-31 (discussing the use of the "content-based/
content-neutral distinction" to extricate the real motivation of government in enacting a
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under the third step of O'Brien proceeds to whether Congress's legiti-
mate stated purposes behind FACE are merely a pretext: an attempt to
hide government's hostility toward the entire subject of the abortion de-
bate, or the pro-life viewpoint.296
2. FACE's Prohibition of Force and Physical Obstruction Does Not
Discriminate Against the Subject Matter of Abortion Speech
Congress drafted FACE to ensure that it would not infringe upon such
constitutionally protected activities as speech-making, distributing leaf-
lets, carrying picket signs, and praying in front of clinics.29 7 What FACE
does regulate through its prohibition of force and physical obstruction is
the violent conduct and barricading tactics that occur because a person is
either obtaining or providing reproductive health services.298 The mere
fact that FACE only regulates conduct occurring at reproductive health
facilities, however, does not make it a subject matter discrimination regu-
lation.299 It is a fundamental principle of government that Congress may
address one problem at a time, otherwise "[i]t would be a prescription for
constitutional deadlock if Congress, every time it addressed a given prob-
regulation). Professor Stone also notes that government will more likely pass a content-
based regulation because of disagreement with the content, rather than approval. See id.
296. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922-23 (8th Cir.) (analyzing whether
FACE is a content-based regulation), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-
5615); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 652 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995)
(recognizing that its discussion of whether FACE is content-based was the same as
O'Brien's requirement that the statute not be related to the suppression of expression);
United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1435-36 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that the
O'Brien factor of not regulating to suppress certain ideas "tracked the content- and view-
point-neutrality test discussed" previously).
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(2) (expressly pronouncing that nothing in FACE shall be
interpreted to proscribe protected First Amendment activity); see also HousE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 708-09 (providing types of prohibited activities covered by FACE). Many
pro-life members of Congress voted for FACE because it restricts violent conduct, not
protected speech. See 140 CONG. REC. H3134-35 (daily ed. May 5, 1994) (vote tally on S.
636); 140 CONG. REC. S5628 (daily ed. May 12, 1994) (vote tally on S. 636); see also supra
notes 288-89 (providing examples of self-avowed pro-life members that supported FACE's
passage).
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).
299. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 651 (stating that just because "one ideologically
defined group is more likely to engage in the proscribed conduct" it does not immediately
follow that the statute is content-based). But cf. Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 143, at
263 (advocating that FACE "imposes severe sanctions on a demonstrator at an abortion
clinic without imposing any sanction on an otherwise identical demonstrator at a nuclear
power plant or at a research hospital engaged in animal experimentation").
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lem, had to scan the ideological horizon and address every other problem
that is like it or that is its mirror image. 300
Congress had a proper purpose, established by valid congressional
findings, in protecting the health and safety of clinic employees and pa-
tients through a proscription on violent, destructive, and obstructive con-
duct. 31 1  Only the nationwide anti-abortion activity surrounding
reproductive health services was found by Congress to be serious enough
to affect interstate commerce and warrant a federal response.30 2 Further-
more, Congress found that the national campaign waged on abortion clin-
ics undermined the constitutional right to an abortion, and placed the
public health and safety in jeopardy.30 3 Congress legislated to prevent
the unlawful conduct's adverse effects on interstate commerce, prohibit
interference with a constitutional right, and prohibit the violent and dis-
ruptive actions it found harmful enough to warrant federal attention.30 4
300. Hearing, supra note 28, at 92 (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe); see Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (stating that government may choose to legislate
against specific conduct that produces harm to individuals and society); American Life
League, 47 F.3d at 651 (pronouncing that Congress may decide to legislate only those ac-
tions it considers to be of prime importance).
301. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923 (citing to congressional reports on FACE, the court
concluded that Congress enacted FACE to prohibit conduct that interferes with the ability
of women to gain to access reproductive health services, which includes abortion); Riely v.
Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 700 (D. Ariz. 1994) (finding that Congress's purpose was to protect
medical facilities and staff from violence and other forceful and threatening tactics); see
also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 699 (furnishing the purpose of FACE as deterring
"the growing violence accompanying the debate over the continued legality and availabil-
ity of abortion and other reproductive health services"); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at
2 (providing that congressional purpose for enacting FACE was premised on preventing
the use of violence, physical obstruction, and other types of destructive activity against
those who provide abortion-related services).
302. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir.) (asserting that
"Congress may choose to legislate only against actions it considers to be more serious" and
that the conduct surrounding the provision of abortion services was more serious than
conduct that affected such services incidentally, such as labor protesting), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 55 (1995); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing congressional
findings regarding the impact of abortion violence, obstruction, and threatening conduct
on interstate commerce). But see Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 143, at 282. The au-
thors find FACE to be a content-based statute, explaining, "Abortion protestors are not
the only political protestors to obstruct others in an attempt to intimidate or prevent them
from exercising their legal rights, but they would be the only ones singled out for special
punishment as a matter of federal law." Id. They assert that FACE punishes civil disobe-
dience based on a disagreement with the pro-life viewpoint. See id.
303. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 704-07; see also supra notes 25-37 and accom-
panying text (elucidating the nationwide scope and effect of anti-abortion conduct prior to
the enactment of FACE).
304. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648 (finding that FACE prohibits the unpro-
tected violent and obstructive conduct that was adversely affecting the provision of abor-
tion services, and consequently, the disruption of interstate commerce); Council for Life
Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting that FACE regulates
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Therefore, FACE does not discriminate based on the subject matter of
abortion speech. Rather, Congress legislated to prevent violent, obstruc-
tive, and destructive conduct, which happens to surround the abortion
debate, and the conduct's injurious effects.3 °5
3. FACE Does Not Regulate Conduct to Silence the Pro-Life
Point of View
FACE's applicability depends in part on the actor's motive.30 6 To vio-
late the statute, one must engage in the proscribed activity with the intent
to injure, intimidate or interfere with another person because that person
is seeking either to provide or obtain reproductive health services.3 ° 7
The mere presence of a motive requirement in a regulation, however,
does not automatically render a statute viewpoint-based. 3 8 The issue is
whether Congress was attempting to disadvantage the pro-life viewpoint
through FACE's regulation of conduct, and especially by means of the
motive requirement.
The fact that one group is more likely to engage in the activity prohib-
ited by Congress does not render the restriction one based on discrimina-
tion toward a particular viewpoint.30 9 Even though pro-life activity may
any conducr'protected by the First Amendment in its response to anti-abortion violence);
see also Hearing, supra note 28, at 94 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe). Professor Tribe
stressed, "One of the most common recurring phrases in U.S. Supreme Court opinions...
is that the Constitution permits legislative bodies to move one step at a time." Id.
305. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text (explaining the application of the
Equal Protection Clause's compelling governmental interest test to discriminatory regula-
tions of the content of speech).
306. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (prohibiting activity if it is motivated by another person
either obtaining or providing reproductive health services).
307. See id. § 248(a)(1). The Fourth Circuit asserts that the motive requirement is the
crux of the viewpoint discrimination argument. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 649.
308. The Supreme Court made this point abundantly clear in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476 (1993). In Mitchell, the statute increased the punishment of unprotected conduct,
such as aggravated battery, when the act was motivated by discrimination based on an-
other's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, or national origin. See id. at 480.
The Court clearly distinguished the holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul because the city
ordinance in R.A. V. was plainly tailored to discriminate against a category of unprotected
expression, whereas the statute in Mitchell was aimed at unprotected conduct. See id. at
487.
309. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994) (holding
that an injunction against anti-abortion protestors does not render it content-based
although it affects people with a particular viewpoint); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 385-86 (1968) (upholding a statute prohibiting draft card burning although the most
likely offenders would be opposed to the Vietnam War); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76
F.3d 913, 923 (8th Cir.) (insisting that there is no "disparate impact theory in First Amend-
ment law"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615); American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir.) (stating that a statute does not cease to be
neutral just because one side in a debate is more likely to engage in the prohibited con-
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be most affected by FACE,31 ° the term "reproductive health services" is
broad enough to cover health services other than abortions.31' There-
fore, if a pro-choice protestor interferes with a woman trying to gain ac-
cess to a reproductive health clinic for routine pregnancy services, the
protestor may be charged under FACE if the interference is motivated by
the fact that the woman is obtaining reproductive health services.312 In
fact, charges brought against an abortion rights supporter for threatening
to kill workers at a pregnancy counseling center demonstrate that FACE
is both neutral on its face and in application.31 3
Nor does R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul314 require a contrary result.315 The
ordinance struck down by the Court in R.A.V was a regulation directed
at speech: it prohibited certain categories of "fighting words," character-
ized as "hate speech," based on viewpoint. 316 The Court found that gov-
ernment's purpose in the viewpoint regulation of a subset of an
duct), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); see also Hearing, supra note 28, at 100 (statement
of Laurence H. Tribe). Addressing this point, Professor Tribe emphasized, "It is crucial to
recognize that nothing in the first amendment remotely shields objectively defined, non-
speech conduct from regulation simply because many or even most of those who engage in
that conduct are likely to share a certain philosophy or viewpoint." Id.
310. See Hearing, supra note 28, at 100 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe) (conceding
that physical obstruction of a clinic by a protestor motivated by something other than a
pro-life viewpoint would be rare).
311. See Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (S.D. Cal. 1994)
(recognizing that the broad statutory definition does not restrict the meaning to clinics that
provide abortion services).
The Seventh Circuit noted that FACE is a facially neutral statute, and does not distin-
guish between pro-life and pro-choice conduct. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370,
1376 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996) (No. 96-141).
The court hypothesized that if FACE provided for stiffer criminal penalties for pro-life
defendants who violated FACE, then the distinction would most likely be unlawful. See id.
312. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 649 (asserting that anyone who engages in
the prohibited conduct with the required intent violates FACE, regardless of the viewpoint
of the actor); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 702 (D. Ariz. 1994) (finding that FACE
applies to both pro-life and pro-choice activity).
313. See United States v. Mathison, Crim No. 95-085-FVS (E.D. Wa. 1995); Brief for
the United States as Appellee at 19, United States v. Hatch, sub nom. United States v.
Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26,
1996) (No. 96-141).
314. 505 U.S. 337 (1992).
315. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (illustrating that R.A.V. was
inapplicable because it regulated speech, where the statute at issue in Mitchell was aimed
at unprotected conduct); Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1376 (finding that FACE is analogous to the
regulation in Mitchell, directed at unprotected conduct, and not the ordinance in R.A.V.,
which regulated speech through its proscription of "fighting words"). But see Rose & Os-
born, supra note 274, at 1527-31 (contending that the holding in R.A.V., and not Mitchell,
applies to FACE). Rose and Osborn find that FACE regulates unprotected expressive
conduct, and that the ordinance in R.A.V. also regulated unprotected expressive conduct
through its prohibition on hate speech. See id. at 1531-32.
316. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
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unprotected category of speech was based on a discriminatory animus to-
ward "hate speech," and that the government did not meet the compel-
ling governmental interest test necessary to withstand the viewpoint
discrimination challenge.317
Conversely, FACE does not regulate based on any viewpoint: it regu-
lates the conduct of force and physical obstruction.31s FACE is analogous
to the regulation before the Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,319 which in-
volved an increased penalty statute that required, for its applicability, an
intent on the part of the defendant to select a victim based on a discrimi-
natory motive. 320 The Court found the regulation to be constitutional
because the statute regulated the underlying non-expressive conduct, dis-
tinguishing the Mitchell holding from that of R.A.V. by explaining that
the ordinance in R.A.V. regulated expression.32'
In short, Congress's legislative purpose in enacting the force and physi-
cal obstruction proscriptions in FACE is unrelated to the suppression of
speech, and not in any way motivated by an animus directed at the sub-
317. See id. at 395-96.
318. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting use of force and physical obstruction
that "intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate
or interfere with any person because that person is or has been ... obtaining or providing
reproductive health services"); United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1376 (7th Cir.)
(stressing that FACE is about conduct that has "physical consequences that are independ-
ent of symbolic significance"), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 26, 1996)
(No. 96-141).
319. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
320. See id. at 487-88. The defendant in Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery,
and received an increased penalty for severely beating a white boy, whom he apparently
selected as a victim solely because the boy was Caucasian. See id. The Court rejected the
argument that the motive requirement was discriminatory, explaining that the underlying
conduct was unprotected by the First Amendment. See id. at 487.
The Seventh Circuit stated that the distinguishing factor quoted by the Mitchell Court,
which was "the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at expression
[namely hate speech] ... [whereas] the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected
by the First Amendment," could be used to combat the constitutional charge against
FACE. Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-89) (alterations in origi-
nal); see also Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 703 (D. Ariz. 1994) (maintaining that FACE
is unlike the ordinance in R.A.V. because FACE regulates unprotected conduct).
321. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the
motive requirement in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" is compatible with the First Amendment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389; see also
American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 650 (4th Cir.) (discussing the motive
requirement of FACE, the court pointed out that Title VII includes a motive requirement
and has been upheld by the Supreme Court as not violative of the First Amendment), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
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ject matter of abortion, or the pro-life viewpoint.322 Therefore, FACE is
a content-neutral regulation of conduct and meets the third step of
O'Brien.323
4. FACE Meets the Remaining Components of the O'Brien Test
Because it has been established that Congress enacted FACE for rea-
sons unrelated to the suppression of speech, the analysis then continues
with the remaining components of the O'Brien test.324 The considera-
tions are whether FACE was enacted pursuant to valid congressional
power, whether it furthers a substantial governmental interest, and finally
whether the incidental restrictions on First Amendment guarantees are
no greater than necessary.325
Applying the first step of O'Brien to FACE, Congress has the authority
to enact FACE pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.326 Second, the
statute furthers substantial governmental interests.327 Specifically, FACE
322. See supra notes 276-321 and accompanying text (illustrating that the congressional
purpose behind enacting FACE is legitimate, and that no discriminatory motive based on
the subject matter of abortion or the pro-life viewpoint exists).
323. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374 (finding that FACE does not discriminate against the
pro-life viewpoint, but that it targets unprotected conduct); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76
F.3d 913, 923 (8th Cir.) (stating that FACE's motive requirement accomplishes the "per-
fectly constitutional task of filtering out conduct that Congress believes need not be cov-
ered by a federal statute"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615);
American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652 (pronouncing that FACE was not enacted to sup-
press the pro-life message, but instead to prohibit unlawful conduct); United States v.
Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995) (deciding that the motive requirement
permissibly narrowed the prohibited behavior that Congress found substantially affected
interstate commerce); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1435 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(recognizing that "Congress was extremely cautious in balancing defendants' First Amend-
ment rights"); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 702 (D. Ariz. 1994) (stating that FACE's
language would "apply to an individual who spray paints the words 'KEEP ABORTION
LEGAL' on a facility providing counseling regarding abortion alternatives as well as the
individual who spray paints 'DEATH CAMP' on a facility providing abortion services");
Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (W.D. La. 1994) ("Violence is the target of...
[FACE], not speech, and as such is a constitutionally permitted intrusion."); Council for
Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that the govern-
mental purpose behind enacting FACE was the permissible goal of halting the violence
occurring at reproductive health clinics, as opposed to "a desire to curb any anti-abortion
message some people wish to convey").
324. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (illustrating the four steps of an
O'Brien examination); supra notes 283-323 (finding that FACE meets the third prong of
O'Brien).
325. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 651-52; Lucero,
895 F. Supp. at 1424; White, 893 F. Supp. at 1436-37; Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 700.
326. See American Life League 47 F.3d at 647; see also supra notes 117-34 and accom-
panying text (providing Congress's Commerce Clause authority to enact FACE).
327. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 55 (1995). The Fourth Circuit found two distinct interests. See id. One related
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promotes public health and safety by providing safe access to medical
clinics, protects the exercise of a constitutional right, and remedies the
detrimental effects of clinic blockades on interstate commerce.328 As pre-
viously discussed, O'Brien's third step is satisfied because the force and
obstruction provisions of FACE regulate conduct without regard to the
suppression of speech.329
Finally, the conduct prohibited by the statute does not unduly burden
more speech than necessary to achieve the government's interest.330
FACE allows for peaceful protesting, speeches, sidewalk counseling, and
distribution of literature, as long as these activities are not performed in a
manner that physically obstructs with the intent to injure, intimidate or
interfere with another's entrance or exit from a clinic.3 31 Therefore,
FACE withstands the O'Brien test, even assuming arguendo that it inci-
dentally affects some expressive conduct that is inextricably entwined
with proscribed activity.332
B. Threats of Force: FACE's Constitutional Regulation of Pure Speech
Courts must recognize that in one of its provisions, FACE regulates
purely verbal behavior through its proscription of threats of force that
intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with another person because
to protecting public health and safety, and interstate commerce, and the other interest
sought to "protect[ I women and men from violence and threats in the exercise of their
rights." Id. Expounding upon this, the court recognized that the Supreme Court has iden-
tified government's strong interest in "protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medi-
cal or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy." Id. (quoting Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994). The court concluded that this
freedom encompasses the right to obtain an abortion, recently reaffirmed by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See id.; see also Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 700 (pro-
nouncing that Congress identified suitably important interests to regulate the conduct in
FACE); see also supra notes 2-11, 68, and accompanying text (discussing the substantial
governmental interests that Congress sought to further with FACE).
328. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 651.
329. See supra notes 297-323 and accompanying text (concluding that FACE is not a
content-based regulation based on either the subject matter or viewpoint of speech).
330. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652 (noting that most of the conduct pro-
scribed by FACE lacks protected expressive speech components); United States v. Lucero,
895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that although FACE may affect some
peaceful protest where physical obstruction is involved, the "prohibition is no more restric-
tive than necessary").
331. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652.
332. See supra note 323 and accompanying text (citing cases that stand for the proposi-
tion that FACE withstands O'Brien scrutiny). But see Rose & Osborn, supra note 274, at
1534-35 (finding that FACE is content-based because the "limited applicability of FACE
gives rise to the inference that Congress targeted abortion protests out of a hostility to the
message conveyed and, in particular, a desire to suppress the activities of the pro-life
movement").
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that person is either obtaining or providing reproductive health serv-
ices.333 This prohibition is not properly evaluated under O'Brien, a test
limited to expressive non-verbal conduct." Though threats are pure
speech, they are not protected by the First Amendment.335
FACE is neither the first nor the only federal statute to prohibit threats
of force. For example, it is unlawful to intimidate, threaten or coerce a
foreign official in the course of her duties; 336 to threaten, intimidate or
interfere with any person from exercising certain designated rights;337
and, to knowingly and willfully threaten the President or Vice President
of the United States.338 Although all these statutes prohibit speech, they
are permissible content-discrimination regulations because "the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech is proscribable. ''339 Threats are unprotected speech be-
cause the government has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens
from fear of violence, and especially from the possibility that what today
is a threat may tomorrow come true.340 It is permissible to "regulate
speech to the extent that the communicative impact of the words on the
listener is that of fear of bodily harm., 341
Moreover, FACE's proscription of threats of force is not based on an
animus toward the pro-life viewpoint for the same reasons argued in the
previous section: the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of speech."42
Congress found that all the activity prohibited by FACE, including
threats of force, interfered with public health and safety, a women's right
to reproductive health services, and substantially affected interstate com-
333. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994).
334. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text (illustrating that an O'Brien exami-
nation only is utilized when scrutinizing expressive conduct).
335. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court
does not consider threats of force to be protected under the First Amendment).
336. See 18 U.S.C. § 112(b).
337. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b).
338. See 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). This statute was examined and held to be constitutional.
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); see also infra notes 346-47 (providing
background on Watts).
339. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
340. See id. The Supreme Court concluded that the reason threats are outside the First
Amendment is to protect "individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that
fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Id
341. Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 701 (D. Ariz. 1994). The court cites to Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, in which the Supreme Court stated "clearly, threats to patients or
their families, however communicated, are proscribable under the First Amendment." 114
S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994); see also United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1531 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding no doubt that threats of force may be permissibly prohibited).
342. See supra notes 278-323 and accompanying text (examining the stated congres-
sional purposes for enacting FACE and also delving into whether the purposes were a
pretext for either subject matter or viewpoint discrimination).
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merce. 343 Furthermore, FACE's motive requirement does not evince dis-
criminatory intent on behalf of Congress to silence the pro-life
viewpoint. 3 " Therefore FACE does not present an R.A.V. situation,
again, because threats of force are not prohibited by FACE based on
viewpoint.345
1. What Constitutes a Threat of Force Under FACE?
While the Supreme Court has found that threats of force are not pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment, it has never provided a defini-
tion of what constitutes a threat, other than to state that it must be a true
threat.346 It is clear that when proscribing pure speech conduct, First
Amendment rights must be kept in mind.34 7 In search of a First Amend-
ment formula to apply to FACE's proscription of threats, the fighting
words doctrine is proffered, yet promptly rejected.
Use of the fighting words doctrine in defining threats of force is inap-
propriate, for the doctrine requires the likelihood of a violent response by
the listener toward the speaker, not vice versa.34' A Brandenburg analy-
sis seems slightly better suited to an examination of whether words spo-
ken are threats of force under FACE, but it ultimately fails to provide an
applicable standard of analysis.349
343. See supra notes 278-323 and accompanying text (illustrating Congress's legislative
purposes for FACE's regulation of conduct); see also note 10 (describing the types of
threats of force experienced by abortion providers).
344. See supra notes 306-23 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of
FACE's motive requirement).
345. See supra notes 228-36 and 314-21 and accompanying text (discussing the issue and
holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
346. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). At a political rally on the
Washington Monument grounds, an eighteen year old remarked about the draft, "If they
ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J. [President
Lyndon Baines Johnson]" Id. at 706. He was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a), which
prohibits a knowing and willful threat to take the life of the President. See id. The Court
reversed the conviction, finding the statement to be "political hyperbole" and not a "true
threat" as required by the statute. Id. at 708. Furthermore, Watt's statement was condi-
tioned upon being drafted, and when he made the allegedly threatening comment, people
laughed. Id. at 707-08.
347. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (noting that while the language of political debate is
often "vituperative, abusive and inexact," the First Amendment does not prohibit such
language); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir.) (finding that the First
Amendment does not permit government to punish aggressive or forceful speech), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615).
348. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (describing the
fighting words doctrine as words that are likely to make the addressee commit an act of
violence, probably against the speaker); see also supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text
(outlining the fighting words doctrine and its evolution).
349. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 922 n.5. The Eighth Circuit found the Brandenburg test
inapplicable to FACE, because it only applies to regulations that prohibit speech that in-
19961
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Brandenburg requires that a statute prohibiting speech that advocates
the use of force must be limited to proscribing advocacy that is "directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and that the advocacy is
likely to produce such a response.35 ° The Court's formulation of the in-
citing unlawful conduct exception to First Amendment protection has
been limited to public speech directed to encourage others to engage in
violent or unlawful activity.35' FACE involves privately communicated
threats directed to one individual352 and does not encompass a violent
reaction by the listener toward a third party.353
FACE's legislative history provides an illustration of the types of
speech Congress intended to prohibit through the statute's threats of
force provision.354 According to Congress, threats of force are present
where "it is reasonably foreseeable that the threat would be interpreted
as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm., 355 Also
related to a threat definition is the term "intimidate," which is defined as
placing a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. 356
The few courts reviewing an alleged FACE violation based on the
threats of force provision consequently have designed a set of factors
from which to determine whether a "threat of force" has been commit-
ted.357 The Eighth Circuit provided a number of considerations when at-
tempting to define whether speech constituted a threat:
cites the listener to use violence against a third party. See id. FACE prohibits the speaker
from "directly threatening another person." Id. A district court in Arizona also declined
to find Brandenburg useful in examining FACE's proscription against threats. See Riely v.
Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 702 (D. Ariz. 1994).
350. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); see supra notes 199-
207 (discussing Brandenburg and its application).
351. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (examining pub-
lic speeches made by civil rights leader); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (inspect-
ing demonstration speech made in public streets); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447
(scrutinizing speech made by a KKK leader taped for television).
352. See Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 702.
353. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 922 n.5.
354. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
355. Id. at 23.
356. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) & (e)(4) (1994). The court in Hoffman v. Hunt found
this provision and the definition of intimidate to be unconstitutional because the statute's
operation depends on the subjective reaction of the listener to the speech. 923 F. Supp.
791, 822 (W.D.N.C. 1996). Moreover, the court maintained that this provision extended
beyond both the fighting words and inciting unlawful conduct doctrines, further rendering
the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. See id.
357. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925-26 (8th Cir.) (outlining a number
of factors when assessing whether speech constituted a threat), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Aug. 6, 1996) (No. 96-141); Lucero v. Trosch, 928 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
(adhering to the factors set out by the Eighth Circuit in Dinwiddie). The Eighth Circuit
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[T]he reaction of the recipient of the threat and of other listen-
ers; whether the threat was conditional; whether the threat was
communicated directly to its victim; whether the maker of the
threat had made similar statements to the victim in the past; and
whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the
threat had a propensity to engage in violence. This list is not
exhaustive, and the presence or absence of any one of its ele-
ments need not be dispositive 8
Courts take into account the circumstances of the threatening speech,
and apply these factors to the situation.359 Upon application of the above
guidelines, FACE's proscription against threats was found not to be vio-
lated by a Catholic priest who appeared on a nationally televised talk
show with an abortion provider.36 ° Although the priest's remarks were
highly inflammatory and involved affirmative statements that the doctor
was a mass murderer and should be dead,36' the court ruled that under all
the circumstances, it could not find a genuine threat of force under
FACE.362
borrowed extensively from its decisions addressing other threat statutes to create a list of
considerations for a definition of threat under FACE. See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925.
358. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925 (citations omitted).
359. See id. at 925-26. The facts of the threat situation in Dinwiddie permitted the court
to hold that Ms. Dinwiddie's statements were threats of force within the meaning of FACE.
See id. at 925. The Court found that between mid-1994 and early 1995, Ms. Dinwiddie used
a bullhorn to warn an abortion provider approximately 50 times to "'remember Dr. Gunn
.... This could happen to you.... He is not in the world anymore.... Whoever sheds
man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed." Id. The doctor was aware that Ms. Dinwid-
die had attacked a maintenance supervisor at Planned Parenthood, physically obstructed
the entranceway, and told the executive director of the facility, "'[Y]ou have not seen vio-
lence yet until you see what we do to you." Id. The doctor began wearing a bullet proof
vest in response. See id. at 926. The manner in which the statements were made, the
surrounding circumstances, and the fact that they placed the doctor in "reasonable appre-
hension of bodily harm" supported the court's conclusion that they were threats of force
under FACE. Id. at 925.
360. See Trosch, 928 F. Supp. at 1124. Father Trosch is an avid supporter of the "justifi-
able homicide" doctrine, which is described by him as "'anyone participating in the direct
act of murdering innocent human beings, can have [his or her] life forfeited in the defense
of innocent human life."' Id. at 1125 (alterations in original) (quoting Father Trosch). He
was suspended by the Catholic Church after an attempt to place newspaper advertisements
that espoused the view of justifiable homicide. See Smothers, supra note 2, at 26.
Appearing on the Geraldo Show with Dr. Lucero, who was himself not a stranger to this
type of public forum for discussing the abortion debate, Father Trosch made several in-
flammatory and "emotionally charged" remarks aimed at Dr. Lucero concerning killing
abortion doctors and Dr. Lucero in particular. Trosch, 928 F. Supp. at 1127.
361. When asked by Geraldo Rivera, the show's host, whether the priest would murder
an abortion doctor if he had a gun in his possession, the priest replied, "'No, I would not
murder him, but I would kill him. There's a difference."' Trosch, 928 F. Supp. at 1127.
362. See Trosch, 928 F. Supp. at 1228-30. The court examined the statements in the
context in which they were made. See id. at 1230. The court pointed out that the state-
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VI. CONCLUSION
While it has been alleged that FACE violates basic Constitutional pro-
visions, such as the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause, FACE
simply safeguards every citizen's opportunity to exercise his or her rights
under the Constitution. Congress properly enacted FACE by laying the
groundwork for its Commerce Clause authority to enact FACE through
abundant congressional findings. These findings demonstrated that the
conduct regulated by the statute substantially affects the economic and
commercial nature of interstate commerce.
Furthermore, Congress enacted a statute that is consistent with First
Amendment guarantees. FACE neither discriminates against the pro-life
viewpoint nor the subject matter of abortion speech. FACE is not about
regulating expressive conduct or protected speech, but about prohibiting
violent, physically obstructive, and threatening acts that are outside the
realm of the First Amendment protection, regardless of the message that
may motivate them. The motive requirement merely limits FACE's ap-
plicability by narrowly tailoring the statute to prevent the type of violent
and unlawful behavior surrounding reproductive health services that
Congress found serious enough to garner federal attention.
Finally, FACE is not constitutionally overbroad or void for vagueness.
There is no chilling effect on free speech because FACE's language is
clearly defined and carefully modeled after other federal statutes so that
an average person can understand what is prohibited, and its scope is
limited to unprotected conduct and speech. Therefore, pro-life support-
ers may protest the legality of abortion outside clinics by making
speeches, handing out literature, sidewalk counseling, picketing, and
praying, as long as these activities are done peacefully, and without physi-
cally obstructing access to a facility with the intent to injure, intimidate or
interfere with a person who is either obtaining or providing reproductive
health services.
Most importantly, FACE has accomplished what it was designed to do.
A recent survey demonstrates that violent, disruptive, and obstructive ac-
tivity at reproductive health service facilities has dramatically decreased
ments were made on a nationally televised show to Dr. Lucero, who was well aware of
Father Trosch's viewpoint previous to appearing on the show. See id. Furthermore,
although the court termed the statements "extreme," it could not ignore the several qualifi-
cations and verbal tempering made by Father Trosch during the show. See id. For exam-
ple, when asked if he had the courage to say that he would kill the doctor, Father Trosch
replied "[h]e deserves to be dead, absolutely." Id. at 1127. The court concluded after
reviewing all of the circumstances as a whole, it could not find by even a preponderance of
the evidence that the statements made by Father Trosch to Dr. Lucero constituted threats
of force under FACE. See id. at 1130.
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since FACE became law in May of 1994.363 Consequently, not only is
FACE's constitutionality assured, but so is its deterrent effect on violent
and unlawful acts. The statute can continue providing protection for wo-
men, reproductive health providers, and clinics from the violent and ob-
structionist "in your face" tactics of some groups protesting the legality of
abortion. Those desiring to protest peacefully have nothing to fear from
FACE.
Kristine L. Sendek
363. See Robert Pear, Protests at Abortion Clinics Have Fallen, and New Law is
Credited, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 24, 1996, at A18 (using statistics from a National Abortion
Federation issued news release, containing data compiled from 1977 to present). The sur-
vey illustrates that acts of violence, disruption, and blockades have diminished from 1,987
in 1994 to fewer than 400 in 1996. See id.
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